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A Balance of Interests: The Concordance 
of Copyright Law and Moral Rights in 
the Worldwide Economy  
Michael B. Gunlicks* 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern copyright law is facing an unprecedented challenge.  
The combined and interrelated forces of technological progress and 
globalization have created a communications revolution whose end 
and ultimate direction are impossible to predict.  These forces will 
require national governments to work ever closer to ensure that the 
rights of authors, publishers, and the public are adequately 
protected and that the incentive to create and distribute works of 
authorship is not harmed by unauthorized reproduction and use of 
these works.1 
The United States has recognized this challenge.  Over the past 
30 years, it has worked aggressively to bring its laws into greater 
conformity with those of other nations in order to secure for 
American authors the highest level of international protection.2 
Unfortunately, the path to greater international cooperation in 
the future is blocked by a philosophical divide between the United 
States and continental Europe.3  The United States is the most 
 
 *  Associate, Spotts Fain Chappell & Anderson, P.C.  The College of William & 
Mary, B.A., 1990; George Washington University Law School, J.D. 1995; The Europa 
Institut, University of the Saarland, LL.M. 1998.  The author wishes to thank Spotts Fain 
Chappell & Anderson, P.C., the law library of the University of Richmond, and the 
faculty of the Europa Institut for their support in the preparation of this article. 
 1 See Copyright Treaty, Geneva, Dec. 20, 1996, preamble, 36 I.L.M. 65, 68 (1997) 
(“Recognizing the need to introduce new international rules and clarify the interpretation 
of certain existing rules in order to provide adequate solutions to the questions raised by 
new economic, social, cultural and technological developments.”). 
 2 See 3 MELVILLE B. & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.01 (1998) 
(stating that the motivation behind increased protections for foreign works was to benefit 
American authors by keeping U.S. law in line with the laws of its “principle trading 
partners”).  The United States has progressively adjusted its law over the past 30 years to 
increase protections for foreign authors in America in the hope and expectation that this 
would lead to greater protection for American works abroad.  Id.  In furtherance of this 
aim the U.S. has acceded to the Geneva Copyright Treaty.  Id. 
 3 See Stig Strömholm, Copyright: National and International Development, in 14 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 2, 3-22 (1990) [hereinafter 
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significant adherent of the “Common Law” system of copyright 
protection derived from the common law and copyright statutes of 
the United Kingdom.4  The other major branch of copyright law is 
the “Continental” system of copyright protection, which evolved 
primarily in France and Germany.5  Most other nations in the 
world have systems similar to those of America, France, or 
Germany.6  Despite increasing harmony between these systems, 
the American and Continental approaches to copyright law still 
lack the requisite consensus to guarantee effective and certain 
global protection of copyrightable works in the twenty-first 
century. 
The central cause of the disagreement between the Common 
Law and Continental systems revolves around the question of why 
copyright law exists.  The French and German position is that the 
purpose of copyright law is to safeguard the author’s interests.7  
The United States maintains that the reason for copyright law is to 
serve the public interest.8   
In its essence, however, this distinction between public and 
private interests is esoteric.  The United States Constitution 
provides that Congress has the power “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings . . . .”9 
(hereinafter “Copyright Clause.”).  Thus, the primary 
constitutional purpose for the copyright power is the public 
interest.10  But the Constitution also grants the author a 
 
“Strömholm I”]. 
 4 Also known as the “Anglo-American” system.  See id.  Most Common Law 
systems in the world are based on British law.  Id.  See, e.g., Brad Sherman, From the 
Non-original to the Ab-original, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS 128 (Brad Sherman & 
Alain Strowel eds., 1994) (using the term “Anglo-Australian”). 
 5 Also known as the “civil law,” or the “Romano-Germanic” system.  Other civil 
law systems tend to follow the French and German models.  See Strömholm I, supra note 
3, at 3-22.  Although different in many ways, the French and German approaches to 
copyright law are very similar, especially when compared to the Common Law 
perspective.  Stig Strömholm, Copyright: Comparison of Laws, in XIV INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 3, 3-95 (1990) [hereinafter “Strömholm II”]. 
 6 See Strömholm I, supra note 3, at 3-22.  
 7 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in 
Revolutionary France and America, in OF AUTHORS AND ORIGINS, supra note 4, at 131-
32. 
 8 See id. 
 9 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. 
 10 Id. (“To promote the progress of Science and useful Arts . . . ”).  See Harper & 
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545 (1985) (“copyright is intended 
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fundamental, exclusive right to control his work.11  Consequently, 
the Copyright Clause serves a dual purpose: to protect the interest 
of the public and protect the interests of authors.   
Thus, the goal of copyright law is to protect the public interest 
by protecting the author’s interests.  As stated by James Madison, 
the framer of the Constitution’s Copyright Clause, “the public 
good fully coincides . . . with the claims of individuals.”12  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that the 
primary purpose of copyright law is to protect the rights of the 
individual author in order to safeguard the motivation to create 
works of authorship.13  The only Constitutional limitation on the 
author’s right is that it be limited in time.   
American, French and German law are in agreement that 
copyright law should protect the author’s interests.  Accordingly, 
all three systems have similar provisions regarding the basic rights 
of authors,14 and all recognize that the authors’ interests must be 
balanced with those of the public to ensure the greatest economic 
and social benefit. 
 
to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge”); Goldstein v. California, 412 
U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (“The objective is to promote the progress of science and the arts”); 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the 
[Copyright Clause] is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal 
gain is the best way to advance public welfare.”). 
 11 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8 (“by securing . . . to Authors . . . the exclusive right . . . .”).  
This is the only individual fundamental right contained in the original text of the 
Constitution. 
 12 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison). 
 13 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546 (the Copyright Act “‘is intended to motivate 
the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward’” 
(quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984))).  
See also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The 
immediate effect of [U.S.] copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ 
creative labor.”); Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 559, 565 (the “very objective” of the copyright is 
“to induce new artistic creations”: the copyright statutes are meant to insure that authors 
receive “adequate protection to encourage further artistic and creative effort.”); American 
Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1907) (the “copyright is an 
exclusive right . . . for the benefit of the author or his assigns” and the Copyright Act 
“must be read in the light of the intention of Congress to protect this intangible right as a 
reward of the inventive genius that has produced the work”); Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 
82, 86 (1898) (copyright is “[t]he right of an author to control the publication of his 
works”); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1883) (it should not 
“be supposed that the framers of the Constitution did not understand the nature of 
copyright and the objects to which it was commonly applied, for copyright, as the 
exclusive right of a man to the production of his own genius or intellect” was a 
recognized right at the time). 
 14 See Strömholm II, supra note 5, at 3-53, 71-96.  
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Despite the Euro-American consensus on the importance of 
authors’ rights, one glaring exception to the general harmony 
between American and Continental copyright law remains.  This 
exception concerns the recognition of an author’s moral rights.  
The French and German systems regard moral rights as the heart 
and soul of copyright law.  To the Europeans, moral rights 
symbolize the author-oriented nature of their copyright systems.  
Theoretically, under the European system, the very basis of 
copyright law is an author’s moral right.15 
American copyright law, on the other hand, recognizes no moral 
rights per se.16  Rather, the notion of “moral rights” is generally 
unsettling to the average American lawyer.17  Americans tend to 
fear moral rights because of the broad, subjective and undefined 
nature of the word “moral,”18 and the fear that recognition of these 
rights might unreasonably tip the balance of interests between 
authors and the public in favor of the authors.19  The concern is 
that this tipping of the scales might lead to hypersensitive authors 
making unreasonable demands upon publishers, thereby preventing 
 
 15 See ADOLF DIETZ, DAS DROIT MORAL DES URHEBERS IM NEUEN FRANZÖSISCHEN 
UND DEUTSCHEN URHEBERRECHT 38-39 (1968). 
“Moral rights” can also be defined as “personal rights,” i.e., the 
author’s interests in his work.  The general term “moral right” can be 
equated to the term “natural right.”  Originally, copyright was also 
considered a natural right in the common law, before courts 
considered the natural right to be superseded by statute.   
Id. 
 16 See Gilliam v. American Broad. Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (“American 
copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of 
action for their violation.”).  See also Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952); Vargas 
v. Esquire, 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947). 
 17 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 136 (1994) 
(“unfortunately named moral rights”); Granz, 198 F.2d at 590 (Frank, J., concurring) (it 
smacks of “something not legal, something meta-legal”). 
 18 “Moral” pertains to character, conscience and “general principles of right conduct” 
instead of positive law.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1008 (6th ed. 1990).  There is a fear 
that “wherever the judicial power is allowed to encroach too far on the widely extended 
domain of moral duties, it is in danger of becoming inconsistent and unjust.”  Prince 
Albert v. Strange, 64 Eng. Rep. 293, 309 (V.Ch. 1849).  The failure to maintain the 
distinction between morality and law would open the door “to the most injurious and 
arbitrary invasions of the rights of individuals by the ruling power.”  Id. 
 19 See WILLIAM R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE 
MARK AND ALLIED RIGHTS 310 (1989) (Common law representatives have long feared 
that the recognition of moral rights would cause publishers, employers and the public to 
be “held to ransom as infringers of moral rights at a time when it would be difficult and 
expensive to rectify the wrong.  It was this overbearing potential in foreign laws which 
had for long fuelled the common law antagonism towards them.”). 
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the publication of socially beneficial material. 
This American fear, however, is not justified given the practical 
application of moral rights in the Continental systems.  In France 
and Germany, moral rights are clearly defined and limited.  They 
protect concrete rights of the author — they are not a broad 
amorphous right of action for him to claim whenever his ego feels 
slighted.  In the practical sense, moral rights protect an author 
against an unreasonable use of his work.  American law has long 
recognized the need to prevent unreasonable exploitation by 
invoking an unwritten unfair use doctrine to prevent uses of a work 
that would stymie an author’s creative drive.20   
Accordingly, moral rights do not contradict the public interest 
and are compatible with American law.  Moreover, by acceding to 
the Berne Convention (hereinafter “Berne”) in 1988, the United 
States legally obligated itself to enforce the moral rights of 
authors.21  Berne provides “the highest internationally recognized 
standards” for copyright protection.”22  By acceding to Berne, the 
United States agreed to enforce moral rights in American courts.  
In spite of this legal obligation to guarantee a minimum of moral 
rights protection, to this day the United States refuses to officially 
recognize moral rights, and the enforcement of those rights in 
American courts remains questionable.23 
As the pace of globalization increases, moral rights loom on the 
horizon as a divisive issue.  The majority of countries in the world 
recognize moral rights.24  The American misperception of moral 
rights and refusal to effectively implement them — despite a 
legally binding obligation to do so — continues to be a significant 
barrier to further international agreement on the basic protections 
of copyright law and continues to hinder the expansion of 
copyright protection throughout the globe.  Prior to 1988, the 
absence of the United States from Berne caused other governments 
 
 20 See infra notes 36-306 and accompanying text. 
 21 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Sept. 9, 1886, 
revised in 1908, 1928, 1948, 1967, 1971), 25 U.S.T. 1341 [hereinafter “Berne”]. 
 22 See Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late Than Never: Implementation Of The 1886 Berne 
Convention, 22 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171, 171 (1989) (quoting Remarks of President Ronald 
Reagan on Signing the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1405 (Oct. 31, 1988)). 
 23 See infra notes 358-81 and accompanying text. 
 24 See, e.g., Strömholm I, supra note 3, at 26.  
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to resist American efforts to increase international protection.25  
The United States’ accession to Berne was motivated in part by an 
American desire to enhance its “political credibility” and improve 
its bargaining position internationally.26  By not adhering to Berne 
in full, and by ignoring rights recognized in most other nations, the 
United States continues to leave the door open for other nations to 
refuse American initiatives to improve international protection for 
American authors. 
Ultimately, moral rights could prove to be an effective means of 
combating future threats to the rights of American authors.27  
Effective moral rights protections in the United States and abroad 
will serve to protect American works of authorship from 
challenges caused by technological innovation that do not fall 
within the traditional scope of copyright law. 
The United States must reconsider and change its stance on 
moral rights.  It has made great efforts to change from a system 
that largely ignored the rights of foreigners, to one that grants them 
broad rights.28  Moral rights are the last significant — but most 
symbolic — gap between the basic rights offered to authors by 
American law and the rights enjoyed by authors in most other 
countries.  In short, it is in the United States’ interest to close this 
gap in order to “secure the highest available level” of protection 
for American authors in the global marketplace.29 
This article will demonstrate that moral rights are entirely 
compatible with the Anglo-American approach to copyright law 
and that it is in the public interest of the United States to 
implement effective moral rights protections in conformity with 
the Berne Convention.  Part I will discuss the basic moral rights 
recognized by Continental law and the United States’ obligation to 
 
 25 See Hatch, supra note 22, at 178 (“[T]he conspicuous absence of the United States 
amongst the Convention’s signatory states provided some foreign states with an excuse to 
avoid stronger bilateral protections.”). 
 26 See id. at 179. 
 27 See infra notes 399-406 and accompanying text. 
 28 See Hatch, supra note 22, at 172-81.  As stated by Secretary of Commerce C. 
William Verity during the hearings on joining Berne: “Nobody could match us in our 
disdain for the rights of foreign authors.”  Id. at 173. 
 29 See id. at 171 (The motivation behind joining Berne was to “secure the highest 
available level of international copyright protection of U.S. artists, authors, and copyright 
holders.”) (quoting Remarks of President Ronald Reagan on Signing the Berne 
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1405 (Oct. 31, 
1988)). 
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protect these rights under international law.  Part II will discuss the 
longstanding and nearly absolute protection of the moral right to 
publish under American common and statutory law, and will 
demonstrate that there is little variation between American, French, 
and German protections for the author’s right to control the 
publication of his work.  Part III will briefly discuss the 
international safeguards for the moral rights of attribution and 
integrity, and will demonstrate that American law applies an unfair 
use doctrine that prevents the unreasonable substitution or 
omission of an author’s name and the unreasonable distortion or 
alteration of his work, regardless of the traditional view that United 
States law does not recognize moral rights.  Parts IV, V, VI, and 
VII examine the protections offered by American and Continental 
law to the rights of attribution, integrity, and retraction, and 
demonstrate that these rights enjoy significant protection under 
United States law that does not differ substantially in practical 
application from the protection of those rights under Continental 
law.  Part VIII demonstrates the inherent harmony between United 
States law and moral rights.  Part IX demonstrates that it is clearly 
in the United States’ interest to implement moral rights based on 
the considerations that (i) the United States is in breach of its legal 
obligations under the Berne Convention; (ii) the United States 
could implement moral rights with little or no disruption to either 
the current copyright system or the economic exploitation of the 
work; (iii) American authors deserve equal protection under United 
States law; (iv) the modern challenges to copyright law and 
authors’ rights are unprecedented; and (v) that those challenges can 
only be met on the international level, which is only possible if the 
major copyright producing and consuming nations agree on the 
most fundamental rights of an author in his works.   
I.  MORAL RIGHTS IN GENERAL 
A.  Introduction 
Modern moral rights are the result of transnational legal 
developments in Europe throughout the past century.30  Moral 
 
 30 See 1 STIG STRÖMHOLM, LE DROIT MORAL DE L’AUTEUR EN DROIT ALLEMAND, 
FRANÇAIS ET SCANDINAVE  (1966) [hereinafter “Strömholm III”]. 
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rights protect the product of an author’s genius and labor from 
harmful intrusions by publishers, i.e., those who make the author’s 
work-product public.  Moral rights gained widespread international 
acceptance during the 1920’s to the extent that sufficient support 
existed to add them to the minimum rights of Berne at the Rome 
revision conference in 1928.31 
B.  Moral Rights Under the Berne Convention 
France and Germany are the birthplace of moral rights.  French 
and German law recognize four basic moral rights: (i) The right to 
publish — the right to decide whether, when, how and by whom 
the work will be made public; (ii) the right of attribution — the 
right to receive credit for a published work in the fashion that the 
author wishes; (iii) the right of integrity — the right to prevent or 
be compensated for any actions that mutilate, damage, or 
materially alter the substance of the author’s original work and that 
do harm to the author’s honor or reputation; and, (iv) the right to 
retract — the right to prevent a public dissemination of the work 
prior to or after publication, provided the author meets certain 
conditions.32 
Berne explicitly protects only two of the four moral rights 
recognized by French and German law: the right of attribution and 
the right of integrity.  Insufficient international agreement 
prevented the inclusion of the right to publish and the right to 
retract among Berne’s moral rights.33 
C.  The United States’ Obligations and Interest in Protecting 
Moral Rights 
As a party to Berne, the United States must comply with the 
minimum rights of the treaty.  Among these minimum rights are 
the rights of attribution and integrity, and thus American law must 
 
 31 See id. 
 32 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 32.  The “right to modify” is considered a moral right 
by some, but generally is not included among the moral rights.  “With few exceptions . . . 
legislatures and courts have . . . refused to admit a [right to modify] as claimed by some 
copyright lawyers.”  Strömholm II, supra note 5, at 65.  
 33 See Strömholm III, supra note 30, at 382-403.   
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enforce them.34 
Considering the American interest in achieving greater harmony 
in international copyright law, an appraisal of American 
protections for all four moral rights recognized by Continental law 
is useful in determining the compatibility of moral rights to 
American law.35  For example, although it does not recognize them 
as “moral” rights, American copyright law already explicitly 
protects the right to publish and the right to retract. 
II.  THE RIGHT TO PUBLISH 
An author has complete control over his work until he decides to 
publish it.  This right to publish is one of the fundamental tenets of 
Common Law copyright law and the oldest recognized moral right.  
It is the gateway right for copyright protection as well as moral 
rights protection. 
A. United States Law 
1.  Common Law 
British common law first protected the right to publish in 1732.36  
The American common law right to publish flowed directly from 
this precedent.  As stated by Justice Story, “the adjudications of the 
Courts of the United States and of England are in entire harmony 
upon this branch of the law.”37 
In Wheaton v. Peters, the Supreme Court held “[t]hat an author, 
at common law, has a property in his manuscript . . . cannot be 
doubted.”38  Under the common law right to publish, “the property 
of the author . . . in his intellectual creation [was] absolute until he 
 
 34 But the U.S. can deny these rights to American authors because the country of 
origin retains the right to apply domestic law to its citizens and residents.  See Berne, 
supra note 21, at art. 5(2). 
 35 Much of the resistance to moral rights at the time was based on the belief that the 
United States would be required to adopt rights identical to those in France.  Hatch, supra 
note 22, at 181, 185-86. 
 36 See Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769). 
 37 2 JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 943 (11th ed. 1873). 
 38 33 U.S. 591, 656 (1834). 
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voluntarily part[ed] with the same.”39  The author could only 
relinquish this right by contract or some unequivocal act that 
indicated his intent to part with his right to publish.40  Otherwise, 
the author had the absolute right to determine whether, “when, 
where, by whom, and in what form” the work would be 
published.41  In short, under American common law “the author 
[had] a property” in his expression and “the copyright thereof 
exclusively belong[ed] to him.”42  No law could “compel an author 
to publish” and “[n]o one [could] determine this essential matter of 
publication but the author.”43 
This common law right was recognized by federal and state 
courts and was applied generously.  Courts enforced the right 
specifically for literature,44 plays,45 and letters.46  In general, it 
applied to “‘[e]very new and innocent product of mental labor . . . 
embodied in writing, or some other material form.”47  Thus, as 
long as the expression could be discerned from the material form, 
the right to publish would be protected.  It was enforceable against 
innocent third parties;48 it was perpetual and enforceable by 
heirs;49  and, unlike statutory copyright, it applied to foreigners as 
 
 39 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551 (quoting American Tobacco, 207 U.S. at 299). 
 40 See Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 543 (1872).  An unconditional sale of a 
painting with no reservation of copyright would constitute a transfer of the right to 
publish; Pushman v. New York Graphic Soc., 39 N.E.2d 249, 251 (1942).  A “de facto 
publication or performance or dissemination may tip the balance of equities” against the 
author; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551 (emphasis added). 
 41 See Palmer, 47 N.Y. at 536. 
 42 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, 346 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
 43 Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 Fed. Cas. 967, 968 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 1,076). 
 44 See, e.g., Chamberlain v. Feldman, 89 N.E.2d 863 (1949); Rees v. Peltzer, 75 Ill. 
475 (Cir. Ct. 1874). 
 45 See, e.g., Palmer, 47 N.Y. at 543; Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32 (1882). 
 46 See, e.g., Folsom, 9 Fed. Cas. at 346 (addressees of letters do have the right to 
publish them “upon such occasions, as require, or justify, the publication or public use of 
them; but this right is strictly limited to such occasions.”  This exception might, for 
example, have been invoked by the Clinton Administration to justify the release of 
private letters from Kathleen Willey); Denis v. Leclerc, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 297 (Orleans 1811); 
Grigsby v. Breckenridge, 2 Bush (Ky.) 480 (Ky. App. 1867). 
 47 Palmer, 47 N.Y. at 537. 
 48 See Chamberlain, 89 N.E.2d at 863 (holding that Mark Twain’s heirs could 
prevent publication of an unpublished short story by a third party who had no knowledge 
of any restriction on the work).  See also Folsom, 9 Fed. Cas. at 346 (“A fortiori, third 
persons, standing in no privity with either party, are not entitled to publish” an 
unpublished work.). 
 49 See Chamberlain, 89 N.E.2d at 863. 
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well as citizens.50 
2.  Statutory Law 
Since the passage of the first copyright act in 1790, the right to 
publish has enjoyed indirect or direct protection under the 
copyright statutes.51  As early as 1841, in Folsom v. Marsh, Justice 
Story concluded that the laws of 1790 and 1831 gave “by 
implication to the author, or legal proprietor of any manuscript 
whatever, the sole right to print and publish the same . . . .”52  
Arguably, they gave the author this right explicitly.53  The 
Copyright Act of 1870 also provided that violators were liable for 
damages, and that courts had equitable power to prevent 
unauthorized publication.54  In contrast to its predecessors, the 
Copyright Act of 1909 provided no direct protection, but stipulated 
that nothing in the Act interfered with the common law right to 
publish.55 
In 1976 the right to publish was incorporated explicitly into the 
subject matter of the new Copyright Act in order to conform 
American law to Berne.56  As a result, the Copyright Act now 
 
 50 See Palmer, 47 N.Y. 532, 538 (1872) (“That which is regarded and protected as 
property by the law of the owner’s domicile, as well as by the laws of this State, must be 
equally within the protection of the law, whether the owner be a citizen or alien.”) (citing 
JOSEPH STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 376, 379, 380 (7th ed. 1872). 
 51 The Copyright Acts of 1790 and 1831 both had sections providing that any person 
printing or publishing a manuscript without the consent of the author or the assignee 
“shall be liable” for all damages caused by such a publication.  Copyright Act of 1790, 
ch. 15, § 6, 1 Stat. 124, 125 (1790); Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 9, 4 Stat. 436, 438 
(1831).  Moreover, the Act of 1831 provided that the federal courts “empowered to grant 
injunctions to prevent the violation of the rights of authors” were also empowered 
“according to the principles of equity, to restrain” any non-consensual publication of a 
manuscript.  Ch. 16, § 9, 4 Stat. at 438. 
 52 9 Fed. Cas. at 347. 
 53 The provisions that violators “shall be liable,” and that federal courts have the 
same powers to enforce the right to publish as they do the copyright, speak in favor of 
such an interpretation.  No mention is made of the right to publish as a separate common 
law right in the Copyright Acts of 1790 and 1831. 
 54 See VII ROYAL CROWN CASES 134 (Robert Campbell ed., 1901). 
 55 See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 2, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (1909) (“Nothing in 
this Act shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an 
unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the copying, publication, or 
use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain damages therefore.”). 
 56 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1997) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original 
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
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protects a work entirely from the moment of its creation.57  An 
involuntary transfer of an unpublished work can occur only after a 
voluntary declaration of bankruptcy.58  And the right to publish is 
protected regardless of the nationality of the author.59  Moreover, 
the traditional right to publish was strengthened by the Copyright 
Act’s requirement that a voluntary transfer of copyright be made in 
writing.60  However, the Copyright Act’s inclusion of the right to 
publish did place one significant limitation on the traditional right 
— while the common law right to publish was perpetual, the 
statutory right is limited to seventy years after the death of the 
author.61 
Thus, in general, the inclusion of the right to publish into the 
Copyright Act has not significantly affected the extent of 
protection that was afforded under the common law.  The main 
distinction is that the “fair use” exception did not specifically apply 
to the right to publish before its incorporation into the Act,62 
although similar considerations could “tip the balance of equities 
in favor of a prepublication use.”63 
But even though fair use now applies to the right to publish, “it 
has never been seriously disputed that ‘the fact that the [author’s] 
work is unpublished . . . is a factor tending to negate the defense of 
fair use.’”64  Thus, in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises 
(hereinafter “Harper & Row”), the Supreme Court held that the use 
of excerpts from an unpublished work infringed the author’s right 
 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”).  See also id. § 101 (“A work is 
created when it is fixed . . . for the first time.”).  Every version of a work is protected, no 
matter how incomplete, as long as it is able to be perceived. 
 57 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 544.  “Creation” means fixation in a “copy” for the 
first time: a “copy” is a material object from which the expression can be communicated.  
A work does not have to be finished for creation to occur: every fixed portion of the work 
constitutes the work at that time.  And every version “constitutes a separate work.”  17 
U.S.C. § 101.  Unlike under the Copyright Act of 1909, formalities such as registration 
are no longer required to pursue a claim for infringement.  Id. § 408(a). 
 58 See id. § 201(e). 
 59 See 17 U.S.C. § 104. 
 60 See id. § 204(a).  Prior to the Copyright Act of 1976 the common law right to 
publish could be transferred orally. 
 61 See id. §§ 302, 303.  Thus, the Berne Convention had a limiting effect in this area 
of American copyright law. 
 62 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550-51.  See also infra note 74. 
 63 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551.  See also supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 64 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551.  The Court’s use of the word “tending” 
demonstrates that it did not hold that unauthorized publication automatically negates fair 
use.  See also infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. 
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to publish despite the strong public interest in obtaining the 
information.65  Although the Court indicated that it might have 
found for the author regardless, based on the importance of the 
material taken from the work,66 the Court emphasized the special 
nature of the right to publish, stating that: “Under ordinary 
circumstances, the author’s right to control the first public 
appearance of his . . . expression will outweigh a claim of fair 
use.”67  The Court thereby recognized the author’s interests in 
creative control.68  Under the Court’s rationale, copyright and the 
right to publish are not to be weighed equally:  “Because the 
potential damage to the author . . . is substantial, the balance of 
equities in evaluating . . . fair use inevitably shifts.”69  The right to 
publish “encompasses not only the choice whether to publish at all, 
but also the choices of when, where, and in what form first to 
publish a work.”70 
In Salinger v. Random House (hereinafter “Salinger”), the 
Second Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Harper 
& Row by placing special emphasis on the fact that letters cited 
without permission in a biography of J.D. Salinger were 
unpublished.71  The court went on to hold that both direct quotes 
and close paraphrases of Salinger’s expressions violated his right 
to publish.72  Furthermore, the court stated that Harper & Row 
“conveys the idea that [unpublished] works normally enjoy 
complete protection against copying any protected expression.”73 
In 1992 Congress amended the fair use provision of the 
Copyright Act — “[t]he fact that a work is unpublished shall not 
itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon 
 
 65 See 471 U.S. at 556 (“substantial public import”). 
 66 See id. at 569. 
 67 Id. at 555.  This “right to control” weighs against uses that might be allowed under 
post-publication copyright, such as use in a review or news account.  Id. at 564. 
 68 See id. at 554-55.  See also id. at 564 (“A use that so clearly infringes the copyright 
holder’s interests in confidentiality and creative control is difficult to categorize as 
‘fair.’”). 
 69 Id. at 553.  See also id. at 552-55.  The legislative materials also supported this 
conclusion.  Id. 
 70 Id. at 564. 
 71 See 811 F.2d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1987).  The fact that the biography was unauthorized 
did not help. 
 72 See id. at 97-98.  The paraphrases were used with the intent to copy Salinger’s 
manner of expression. 
 73 Id. at 97. 
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consideration of all [four of the fair use factors].”74  Though the 
intent of this amendment was to limit the broad scope of the right 
to publish, its effect will likely be limited.  In essence, the 
amendment changes nothing with regard to the fair use 
determination for unpublished works.  Neither the Supreme Court, 
nor the Second Circuit, based its decision solely on the fact that the 
works were unpublished.75  Both courts applied the entire fair use 
test; thus, other factors weighed heavily in their decisions.76  The 
unpublished nature of the works weighed heavily in the author’s 
favor, but it was not determinative: it was simply an element to be 
considered in applying the fair use test.77  Congress’ amendment 
changes neither the importance of the right to publish to the author, 
nor the fact that the equities involved in a fair use determination 
differ for the right to publish and the post-publication copyright.78 
B.  Continental Law 
Article 19 of the French copyright law grants the author the sole 
right to publish his work.79  This right ensures the French author’s 
liberty to control the manner and conditions of publication and to 
avoid any non-consensual publication.80  Therefore, the right to 
publish is dependent on the author’s consent,81 which must be 
express or at least able to be implied from the circumstances.82 
Under French law, authors maintain a host of rights.  For 
example, creditors are prohibited from seizing an unpublished 
 
 74 Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1997)).  The 
factors in § 107 to be considered in finding fair use are: 1) the purpose and character of 
the use; 2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used; and 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.  Id. 
 75 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551 (1985) (“tending to negate the defense of fair 
use”); Salinger, 811 F.2d at 97 (2d Cir. 1987) (“normally enjoy complete protection”). 
 76 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-69; Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96-98. 
 77 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 (“The fact that a work is unpublished is a 
critical element in its ‘nature,’” the second fair use factor.). 
 78 See supra notes 37-43, 62-77 and accompanying text. 
 79 Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 19.  (“The 
author has the sole right to make his work public.” [L’auteur a seul le droit de divulguer 
sont oeuvre.]). 
 80 See ALAIN STROWEL, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET COPYRIGHT 495, n. 52 (1993).   
 81 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 60.  Cf. supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 82 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 60.  Cf. supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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work without the author’s consent,83  and public lectures do not in 
and of themselves constitute publication.84  The author also has a 
strong interest in protecting his right to review and correct his 
work.85  An abandonment of a work does not permit a third party 
to publish it.86 
Unlike its American cousin, French copyright law allows an 
author to refuse to deliver his work to a purchaser despite 
contractual obligations, though the author will be liable for 
restitution and damages.87  Furthermore, the moment of delivery is 
not determined by actual delivery of the work, but by the author’s 
decision that the work is completed.88 
In Germany, Article 12 of the copyright law protects the right to 
publish.89  Article 6 of the German law reinforces the notion that a 
publication can occur only with the author’s consent.90  The 
provision that an author can determine “how” his work will be 
 
 83 See Vergne v. Créanciers Vergne, Cour royale de Bordeaux, S. Jur. 1828-30, 2, 5.  
Cf. supra note 58 and accompanying text.   
 84 See Marle v. Lacordaire, Cour royale de Lyon, July 17, 1845, D. 1845, 2, 128; S. 
1845, 2, 469.  Cf. supra note 40 and accompanying text.   
 85 See Lacordaire, D. 1845, 2, 128; S. 1845, 2, 469.  Cf. supra note 68 and 
accompanying text.   
 86 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 59, citing Camoin, Trib. civ., Seine, Nov. 15, 1927, D. 
1928, 2, 89; Paris, Mar. 6, 1931, D. 1931, 2, 88.  Cf. supra note 48 and accompanying 
text.   
 87 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 58, citing Whistler, Trib. civ., Seine, Mar. 20, 1895 & 
Paris, Dec. 2, 1897, D. 1898, 2, 565; Cass. civ., Mar. 14, 1900, D. 1900, 1, 497 (holding 
that artist who contracted to paint a portrait could withhold the portrait from the 
purchaser).  The same result could possibly occur in an American court, but under a 
theory of contract law instead of copyright.  Considering the personal nature of an 
unpublished work, a court might be inclined to award damages instead of specific 
performance. 
 88 See Vollard v. Rouault, Trib. civ., Seine, Sept. 10, 1946, D. 1947, 98; Cour 
d’Appel Paris, Mar. 19, 1947, D. 1949, 20.  See also P. v. Consorts Rouault, Cour  
d’Appel Orléans, Mar. 17, 1965, J.C.P. 1965, 14186.  Such a result would be unlikely in 
an American court.   
 89 See German Federal Republic Copyright Statute [hereafter “FRG”] art. 12 
(translated in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1966) (Official German 
text published in “Bundesgesetzblatt,” v. 9.9.1965 (BGBl. I S.1273))  
(1) The author shall have the right to determine whether and how his 
work is to be disseminated; (2) The right of publicly communicating 
the contents of his work or a description thereof is reserved to the 
author, provided that neither the work, nor its essence, nor a 
description thereof has previously been publicly disseminated with 
his consent. 
Id.  
 90 See FRG, supra note 89, art. 6(1). 
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published corresponds to the author’s right to determine the 
conditions of publication in the United States: “whether[,] . . . 
when, where and in what form first to publish a work.”91 
German copyright law basically grants the author an absolute 
right to control the first publication of his work.  No one can 
publish the work or a description thereof without the author’s 
consent.92  However, this consent can also be implied — a 
communication to a broad public audience can constitute a 
consensual publication.93 
III.  THE RIGHTS OF ATTRIBUTION AND INTEGRITY: THE BERNE 
CONVENTION RIGHTS 
There are certain concerns that are inherently tied to the author’s 
right to control the publication and reproduction of his creation: 
namely, the author’s interest in receiving title to and credit for the 
product of his labors, and his interest in preventing damage to that 
product. 
A.  The Berne Convention 
Article 6bis of Berne protects the “most well-established and 
almost universally accepted”94 moral rights of attribution and 
integrity: 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and 
even after the transfer of the said rights, the author 
shall have the right to claim authorship of the work 
and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation 
to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his 
honor or reputation.95 
 
 91 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564.  Cf. Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 
14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 19. 
 92 See FRG, supra note 89, art. 12(2).  Cf. supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 93 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 61.  Cf. supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 94 Strömholm II, supra note 5, at 44.  
 95 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, at 
art. 6bis(1), reprinted in World Intellectual Property Organization, Guide to the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971) 177 
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Article 6bis does not require uniformity of implementation of 
moral rights: “[t]he means of redress for safeguarding the rights 
granted by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the 
country where protection is claimed.”96 
The attribution right empowers the author “to claim recognition 
of authorship wherever and whenever a protected work is made 
accessible to the public.”97  The integrity right gives the author the 
right to “object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification 
of . . . the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or 
reputation.”98  This conditioning of a violation on prejudice to the 
honor or reputation of the author was done at the insistence of the 
Common Law Berne members.99  The question of damage to the 
honor or reputation of the author is open to different interpretations 
and applications.100  In addition, the right of integrity does not 
prohibit the complete destruction of a work by its owner.101 
B.  American Protection of Moral Rights: An Equitable Rule of 
Reason. 
1.  No Express Rights 
No provision of the Copyright Act, other statute, or the common 
law grants the author an express right of attribution or integrity.102 
 
 
(1978). 
 96 Berne, supra note 95, at art. 6bis(3). 
 97 Strömholm II, supra note 5, at 44. 
 98 Berne, supra note 95, at art. 6bis(1). 
 99 See STROWEL, supra note 80, at 508.  This formula had a greater resemblance to 
the familiar common law concepts of defamation and unfair competition.  Id.  The 
original proposal used the term “moral interests.”  Id. 
 100 See WILHELM NORDEMANN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING 
RIGHTS LAW 87-88 (1990). 
 101 See infra notes 295-97, 302-04 and accompanying text. 
 102 With the exception of visual works of art.  See infra notes 260-93 and 
accompanying text. 
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2.  “Well-Recognized” Rights 
At the core, “there is no question that [the rights of attribution 
and integrity are] well-recognized within the fabric of U.S. law.”103  
The moral rights contained in and required by Berne’s Article 6bis 
are equivalent to rights long recognized by the common law as 
inherent elements of the author’s interests in his work.104  
Although the appellation “moral rights” is a stranger to American 
courts, the rights of attribution and integrity have received 
continuous, albeit limited, protection under the common law and 
statutory law.  These equivalent rights attach at the moment of 
creation and generally protect the author’s work from uses that 
exceed his reasonable consent.  The failure to attribute or a severe 
alteration can injure the author by denying him credit for, or 
changing, the substance of his creation. 
3.  Equivalent Rights: The Unfair Use Doctrine. 
Thus, American law provides a number of alternative means of 
protecting an author’s interests in attribution and integrity.  These 
alternatives derive from an equitable rule of reason.  An agreement 
to publish, or a transfer of the copyright, implies that the work will 
be used in a reasonable manner.  In every contract “there exists an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,” and a party must 
refrain from actions that harm or destroy the rights of the other 
party.105  An “author’s consent to a reasonable use of his 
copyrighted works has always been implied by the courts as a 
necessary incident of the constitutional policy of promoting the 
progress of science and the useful arts . . . .”106  This implied 
reasonable use was applied to support the common law policy of 
fair use.107  But it also means that an unreasonable, unfair use of 
the work implicitly violates the author’s consent to the use of his 
work.  This “‘equitable rule of reason’ . . . ‘permits courts to avoid 
rigid application of the copyright statute when . . . it would stifle 
 
 103 3 NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8D.02(D)(1). 
 104 See infra notes 115-224 and accompanying text. 
 105 See Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (1933).  See 
also Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317, 327 (1920) (Clarke and Pitney, JJ., dissenting). 
 106 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549 (1985) (citing HORACE G. BALL, LAW OF 
COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)). 
 107 See id. at 549. 
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the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.’”108 
In concordance with this unfair use doctrine, American law 
generally protects an author’s moral rights unless he expressly 
consents to waive them.  Uses of the work that exceed the 
reasonable author’s consent and that could affect his creative drive 
are treated as infringements of the author’s rights.  Thus, no 
reasonable expectation of moral rights contradicts the public 
interest.  In fact, the public shares an interest in knowing the true 
source of a work and in receiving the work in unadulterated form. 
Accordingly, market practices also generally respect moral 
rights.  There are few incentives for publishers to violate an 
author’s interests in attribution and integrity.  The publisher has a 
strong incentive to use the author’s name and work faithfully.  The 
publisher’s product is the author’s work.  The publisher has an 
interest in using the author’s name in connection with the product.  
The public wants to know the source of a work and purchases 
many works according to their source.109  Intentionally 
misattributing the work or altering its integrity to an extent that it 
could damage the author’s reputation would: (i) undermine the 
economic value of the author’s work; (ii) undermine the value of 
future works by that author; (iii) dissuade other authors from 
contracting with the publisher; and, (iv) injure the publisher’s 
reputation in the eyes of the public, should the substitution or 
mutilation become public knowledge.110  In short, a reasonable 
publisher recognizes that he cannot make an unreasonable use of 
the author’s work. 
4.  Pre-Publication Protection 
Courts recognize that an author has an exclusive right to 
property in his work.111  The author’s property right is “absolute 
until he voluntarily parts with” it.112  This right includes the right 
to determine “whether . . . when, where, by whom, and in what 
 
 108 Id. at 550. 
 109 See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 110 See, e.g., id. 
 111 See, e.g., Palmer, 47 N.Y. at 537 (“Its basis is property”); Folsom, 9 Fed. Cas. at  
346. 
 112 American Tobacco, 207 U.S. at 299. 
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form” the work will be published.113  The Supreme Court 
confirmed this interpretation in 1985.114  Thus, the protection of 
moral rights under American law is absolute prior to publication. 
5.  Post-Publication Protection 
United States law has consistently protected various aspects of 
the author’s rights to attribution and integrity after publication.  
The Copyright Act indirectly protects aspects of the author’s 
attribution and integrity rights.  In addition, an author can pursue a 
number of common law and statutory claims outside of the 
Copyright Act that prevent an unfair use of the author’s work. 
IV.  THE RIGHT OF ATTRIBUTION 
The right of attribution entails three interrelated rights: (i) the 
right to claim recognition as the author of a work; (ii) the right to 
use an alternative attribution — to remain anonymous or to use a 
pseudonym; and, (iii) the right to prevent a false attribution, i.e., to 
prevent others from inaccurately describing the author’s 
contribution to a certain work. 
A.  The Right to Claim Authorship 
1.  United States Law 
American law protects the right to claim authorship in a number 
of ways, starting with the Copyright Act.  A major purpose of 
copyright is to prevent another person from misappropriating the 
author’s work.  If another person takes the author’s work and 
claims it as his own, he is violating the author’s copyright. 
After a transfer of the copyright, the author usually maintains his 
right to claim attribution.  First, the author can preserve his right by 
contract.  A contract clause providing for attribution will be 
 
 113 Palmer, 47 N.Y. at 536. 
 114 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564 (holding that an author has the right to 
determine “whether . . . when, where, and in what form first to publish a work”). 
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enforced by courts.115  Such a provision will be extended to cover 
“any production based upon the author’s work.”116 
Second, even if a contract is silent regarding attribution, a right 
to claim authorship can be implied.  The failure to attribute can 
constitute a breach of contract, because attribution “necessarily 
affects [the author’s] reputation and standing, and thus impairs or 
increases his future earning capacity”:117 the author’s reputation is 
his “stock in trade” and the failure to attribute can cause him 
“irreparable injury.”118  A contractual obligation to provide 
attribution can also be inferred by the “custom and usage” of the 
industry in question.119  If an implied right to claim authorship is 
found, the author is entitled to injunctive relief or damages.120 
A contract is usually interpreted according to its terms.  Under 
the Copyright Act, an author has certain rights which he can 
transfer individually or collectively.  The right to claim authorship 
is not among those rights.  The author has no statutory right to 
attribution.  Conversely, the transferee gains no contractual right to 
claim authorship absent an express provision, even if the author 
transfers the work in its entirety.  No inference can be made that 
the author transfers the right to attribution automatically when he 
transfers the copyright.121  To do so would contradict the purpose 
of the Copyright Clause and constitute unfair competition.122 
 
 115 See, e.g., Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1952); Paramount Prods., 
Inc. v. Smith, 91 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1937), cert. denied 302 U.S. 749 (1937). 
 116 3 NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8D.03(A)(3). 
 117 Clemens v. Press Publ’g Co., 122 N.Y.S. 206, 208 (Sup. Ct. App. Term. 1910) 
(finding the terms of the contract implied that attribution was an element of the contract).  
See also Granz, 198 F.2d at 588 (holding that harm to an author’s reputation warrants 
relief). 
 118 See Poe v. Michael Todd Co., 151 F. Supp. 801, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (finding 
sufficient showing by author to grant a trial under contract law for a screen play where 
the exact terms of the contract were uncertain). 
 119 See Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).  See 
also Poe, 151 F. Supp. at 802. 
 120 See, e.g., Granz, 198 F.2d at 588 (holding injunctive relief appropriate since harm 
is irreparable and damages are difficult to prove); Poe, 151 F. Supp. at 802 (ruling 
damages trial appropriate where plaintiff filed too late for injunctive relief but damage to 
his reputation could constitute an irreparable injury). 
 121 The copyright is originally the author’s.  It is a right to the use of the author’s 
work.  Even if the author transfers all use-rights to the publisher, the work is still 
originally the author’s product.  Just as a distributor who purchases goods wholesale for 
resale, the publisher has no automatic right to remove the “label of origin” from the 
author’s product.  Only an express contractual waiver would suffice for such a finding. 
 122 Not receiving recognition would stymie the author’s incentive to create.  See, e.g., 
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Thus, even if an author has no right under the Copyright Act or 
contract law, he still maintains a right to pursue a common law or 
statutory claim for unfair competition.  The Copyright Act does not 
pre-empt claims under the theory of unfair competition.123  Unfair 
competition has two forms: passing-off and reverse passing-off.  
Passing off consists of selling goods as those of another in a 
manner that would actually or likely deceive the public.124  
Reverse passing-off occurs when one sells the goods of another as 
one’s own in a manner that would actually or likely deceive the 
public. 
In International News Service v. Associated Press the Supreme 
Court held that reverse passing-off constituted “misappropriation,” 
and therefore unfair competition.125  Although “unfair 
competition” implies competition between two similar products, 
the “invocation of equity rests more vitally upon the unfairness” of 
the product’s representation.126  Using a particular author’s name 
on the packaging and advertising for a work will almost always 
indicate to the public that it is that author’s work.127  Replacing the 
author’s name will mislead the public that another author produced 
the work. 
The crux of the issue in misappropriation cases — similar to the 
standard applied in copyright cases — is “whether the defendant’s 
activities are likely to destroy the incentives for plaintiff and others 
in its position to engage in the relevant productive or creative 
activities.”128  Thus, in Smith v. Montoro (hereinafter “Smith”), the 
Ninth Circuit granted an actor relief under section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act.129  Section 43(a) is the “federal counterpart to state 
 
Poe, 151 F. Supp. at 803 (finding irreparable injury would occur for failure to credit); 
Clemens, 122 N.Y.S. at 208 (stating that attribution “necessarily affects [the author’s] 
reputation and standing, and thus impairs or increases his future earning capacity”). 
 123 See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 234-45 (1918) 
[hereinafter “INS”]. 
 124 See, e.g., id.; Gardella v. Log Cabin Prod., Co., 89 F.2d 891, 896 (2d Cir. 1937). 
 125 248 U.S. at 242.  See also id. at 247 (“The ordinary case [is passing-off,] but the 
same evil may follow from the opposite falsehood . . . [T]he principle that condemns the 
one condemns the other.”) (Holmes, J., dissenting); ROGER E. SCHECHTER, UNFAIR TRADE 
PRACTICES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 123 (2d ed. 1993). 
 126 See Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. 509, 512 (6th Cir. 1924). 
 127 See Yameta Co. v. Capitol Records, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 582, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) 
(advertising and selling records that gave impression that Jimi Hendrix was the primary 
performer misled the public). 
 128 SCHECHTER, supra note 125, at 123.  See also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 541-52. 
 129 648 F.2d at 607 (Section 43(a) is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1997)). 
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[common law] unfair competition laws.”130  In Smith an actor sued 
the defendant for removing and replacing his name in credits and 
advertisements for a film in which the actor had starred.131  The 
court found a violation of § 43(a) for “a false designation of 
origin” or false “representation.”132  The court reasoned that “being 
accurately credited” was of “critical” importance to the livelihoods 
of actors.133  This reasoning would be equally or even more 
compelling and applicable to the primary authors — director, 
screenwriter, score-composer, producer — of motion pictures and 
to the authors of other types of works.134 
The Lanham Act grants an author the right to “ensure that his or 
her name is associated with a work when the work is used.”135  
Section 43(a) “may be used to prevent ‘the misappropriation of 
credit properly belonging to the original creator.’”136  The 
“misappropriation is of the artistic talent required to create the 
work, not the manufacturing talent required” to publish the 
work.137  A Section 43(a) claim is “separate and distinct from a 
claim of copyright infringement.”138  As a result, the right still 
applies to works in the public domain, and is theoretically 
perpetual. 
Section 43(a) does not require that the parties be in competition 
with each other: “any person who believes that he or she is or is 
likely to be damaged” by a misrepresentation of origin or false 
advertisement can invoke the section.139  But the cause of action 
 
 130 Waiver of Moral Rights in Visual Artworks, Final Report of the Register of 
Copyrights, March 1, 1996, at 71. 
 131 See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d at 602. 
 132 See id. at 603.  The Ninth Circuit found the defendant’s actions constituted “reverse 
passing off” — ”the unauthorized removal or obliteration of the original 
trademark . . . before the resale of such goods.”  3 NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 
8D.03(A)(2). 
 133 Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d at 607. 
 134 See 3 NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8D.03(A)(2).  The California Business and 
Professions Code provides a remedy based on the principle formulated by the Ninth Circuit 
in Smith v. Montoro.  See also Meta-Film Assocs., Inc. v. MCA, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1346 
(C.D. Cal. 1984). 
 135 Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 136 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 5, comment c; 2 
NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8.21(E)). 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (1997) (Section 43(a) reads:  
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services . . . 
uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any 
GUNLICKS.PP1 9/6/01  10:41 PM 
624 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.11:601 
 
must be based on more than a plaintiff’s subjective belief.  In order 
to proceed the author must have a commercial interest, which is 
usually defined as a “reasonable interest to be protected.”140  
Because his name and reputation are of “critical importance” and 
“his stock in trade,” the author will almost always have a 
reasonable commercial interest.141 
Thus, the author has extensive rights to claim authorship of his 
work.  Federal law grants him the copyright and the right to make a 
claim under the Lanham Act for misappropriation of his work.  
Under state law, the author can pursue contract-based rights or a 
common law unfair competition claim.  Only an express 
contractual waiver should suffice to deny a right to claim 
authorship: if the author divests himself completely “by plain and 
unambiguous language . . . of every vestige of title and ownership 
of the [work], as well as the right to [its] possession, control and 
use,” he also divests himself of the right to claim authorship.142 
2.  Continental Law 
Both French and German law contain similar provisions 
protecting an author’s right of attribution.  French law requires that 
 
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or 
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation 
of fact, which —  
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of  his or 
her goods, services , or commercial activities, or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another 
person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, 
— shall be liable in a civil action . . . . 
Id. 
 140 See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d at 605 (quoting New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of 
Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 141 See supra notes 118 & 133 and accompanying text. 
 142 Vargas, 164 F.2d at 525 (finding against plaintiff where he transferred all rights in 
the work and agreed specifically that the use of certain designations derived from his name 
and used in connection with his work belonged to the defendant).  See also Harris v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 43 F. Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (holding against 
author where she retained no rights of property in the work and knew that she would not 
receive attribution before the contract was signed).  Express waivers are permissible under 
Berne. 
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the author’s name appear on every copy of the work.143  German 
copyright law provides that the “author shall have the right of 
recognition of his authorship of the work” and that the author 
determines “whether the work is to bear an author’s designation 
and what designation is to be used.”144  Both laws also require that 
the author must receive recognition every time his work is 
quoted.145 
French law contains further and stricter attribution requirements.  
All advertisements and publicity materials related to a work must 
give the author credit.146 Even if he contracts to use a pseudonym 
or remain anonymous, the author can demand recognition under 
his own name at any time and is entitled to damages if the demand 
is ignored.147 
These provisions are not, however, without their limitations.  In 
Germany, when the author has not expressly contracted to protect 
the right to attribution, the right can be limited under certain 
circumstances — the author is precluded from claiming authorship 
if the custom and usage of the industry, good faith, or the nature of 
an employment relationship weigh against attribution.148 
 
 
 143 See, e.g., DIETZ, supra note 15, at 116-26; Russel J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the 
Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists’ Rights in France and the United States, 28 
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1, 27 (1980).  Article 6 of the French law provides: “the author 
enjoys the right of respect for his name, for his authorship, and for his work.”  [“L’auteur 
jouit du droit au respect de son nom, de sa qualite et de son oeuvre.”]  Law No. 57-298 of 
Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 6.  The distinction between name and 
authorship is somewhat unclear.  DIETZ, supra note 15, at 117.  The author has the right 
“to demand that the work is published under his name or chosen designation.”  Johnny 
Hess, Trib. civ., Seine, Feb. 2, 1950, G.P. 1950, 1, 367, cited in DIETZ, supra note 15, at 
123.  Cf. supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 144 FRG, supra note 89, art. 13.  This right was recognized by courts prior to the 
implementation of the law. Landesgericht Hamburg, 26.2.1958, DdA 1959, 135, 
Bundesgerichtshof, 19.10.1962, GRUR 1963, 40.  Architektenurteil, Reichsgericht, 
8.4.1925, RGZ 110, 393.  But generally, there is little case law in Germany on this right.  
The statute adopted the prevailing opinion of German theorists.  DIETZ, supra note 15, at 
117, 122.  Cf. supra note 135 and accompanying text.   
 145 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 121-22; FRG, supra note 89, art. 63.  There are a few 
exceptions.  See infra note 309 and accompanying text. 
 146 See Trib. civ., Seine, Feb. 20, 1922, G.P. 1922, 2, 282.  In the U.S., the Lanham 
Act would protect against replacing the author’s name with another, but the result in a 
case of pure deletion of the name would be uncertain.  See supra notes 115-142, infra 
note 376 and accompanying text. 
 147 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 120.  Guille c. Colmant, CA, Paris, G.P., 1, 17. 
 148 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 121.  See infra notes 325-328 and accompanying text. 
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French law tempers the author’s right by limiting his means of 
redress.  In general, French law gives a broad right to sue, but a 
limited right to recover.  Often, the author is entitled only to 
damages for a failure to attribute.149  For example, in the case of 
Johnny Hess, the author’s name was replaced with that of another 
in film credits.150  The court granted damages even though the 
author had transferred his complete interests in the song, but the 
court refused to enjoin the film.151  In Louiguy, the author received 
only one franc in damages.  The court found that the failure to 
attribute damaged only the author’s moral interests and did not 
damage his earnings capacity because he was already 
internationally famous and successful.152  In short, French law 
limits damages for a failure to attribute absent an economic injury. 
B.  Right of Alternative Attribution: The Right to Remain 
Unknown. 
1.  United States Law 
The Copyright Act takes for granted that an author can publish 
his work under an alternative designation,153 but the author does 
not have any express right to use a pseudonym or remain 
anonymous. 
If the author maintains the copyright, he can control the manner 
in which the work is published, including the attribution used on 
the work.  Furthermore, the author can guarantee alternative 
attribution by an express contract provision. 
Moreover, courts will recognize an author’s rights to use a 
particular pseudonym.  Under common law and statutory unfair 
competition, he can prevent anyone else from using his established 
 
 149 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 123-24. 
 150 See Johnny Hess, Trib. civ., Seine, Feb. 2, 1950, G.P. 1950, 1, 367, cited in DIETZ, 
supra note 15, at 123.  Cf. supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 151 Cf. Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d at 602 (the Ninth Circuit came to a similar result).  
See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text. 
 152 Trib. gr. inst. Seine, , Jan. 12, 1960, RIDA No. XXXI, 101 (1961), Paris, Mar. 14, 
1962, Ann. 1962, 277, cited in DIETZ, supra note 15, at 123. 
 153 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (determining duration of copyright for “Anonymous 
Works, Pseudonymous Works, and Works Made for Hire”).  The Copyright Act of 1909 
also had such a provision.  Ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (1909). 
10:41 PMGUNLICKS.PP7 9/6/01  10:41 PM 
2001] MORAL RIGHTS IN THE WORLDWIDE ECONOMY 627 
 
pseudonym for a work: (i) he did not create; or, (ii) which 
“substantially departs” from the original work; or, (iii) where there 
is a “tendency to deceive the public.”154  An author is also entitled 
to continue using an established pen name after he ends an 
employment relationship with an employer.155 
Whether an author can prevent a transferee from using his real 
name against his wishes, however, is uncertain in the absence of a 
contractual provision.  The U.S. usually follows a rule of truthful 
attribution, i.e., an accurate description of an author’s connection 
to a work.156  Using the author’s real name is a true attribution.  
Absent an express provision, only an unreasonable use of the 
author’s true name will incur liability unless the author has 
recourse to another cause of action.157 
2.  Continental Law 
French law does not expressly protect the right to alternative 
attribution, however the provisions of Articles 6 and 11 of the 
French Copyright law make it clear that the author has a right to 
use a pseudonym or remain anonymous.158  The German law 
protects the right expressly.159  Both laws prevent the publisher 
from revealing the author’s true identity, against his will, on the 
work or any copy.160 
Unlike French law, the German law binds the author to the terms 
of the contract if an author expressly contracts to use an alternative 
 
 154 See, e.g., Geisel, 295 F. Supp. at 354; Clemens v. Belford, Clark & Co., 14 F. 728, 
731 (N.D. Ill. 1883);  Munroe v. Tousey, 13 N.Y.S. 79, 80 (Sup. Ct. 1891). 
 155 See Landa v. Greenberg, 24 T.L.R. 441(1908).   
 156 See, e.g., Geisel, 295 F. Supp. 331.  See also NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 
8D.03(B)(2). 
 157 If a court found that an author reasonably expected to remain unknown and that the 
revelation of his identity would stymie his creative drive, it might be inclined to rule for 
him.  The author might also be able to pursue an action for invasion of privacy.  For 
example, the New York Civil Rights Law prevents the use of a person’s name, portrait or 
picture for advertising purposes without the person’s written consent.  If the author had 
never used his real name, he would be protected, but the case would be less certain if he 
had used his real name in connection with another work.  N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 
(1992).  See infra note 173 discussing the right to privacy. 
 158 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 116-19. 
 159 See FRG, supra note 89, art. 13. 
 160 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 119. 
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attribution.161  An exception applies to this scenario if the author 
must prove his authorship in response to attacks on it,162 or if the 
work enjoys unforeseeable success.163  Absent any express 
provision, the law will imply the right of an author to use his real 
name instead of an alternative attribution whenever he wishes to do 
so.164 
Thus, despite differences in form with respect to their American 
counterpart, the right of the author to prevent revelation of his true 
identity by third persons in France and Germany will similarly 
depend on the individual circumstances.165 
C.  Right to Prevent False Attribution 
1.  United States Law 
American law grants the author extensive rights to prevent false 
attribution.  An author can prevent the attribution to him of a work: 
(i) that he did not create; (ii) which departs substantially from his 
original work; or, (iii) which inaccurately describes the author’s 
connection to the work.166 
Originally, the common law enforced these protections as 
independent, authors’ rights and “incidentally, to prevent fraud 
upon the purchasers.”167  An author was protected “against having 
any literary matter published as his work which is not actually his 
creation.”168  This included situations where the author actually 
created a portion of the work, but the entire work was falsely 
 
 161 See id. at 121. 
 162 For example, if someone questions his authorship of a work or someone else 
claims to be the author.  See id. 
 163 See id. 
 164 See id. 
 165 For example, the degree to which the author defends himself against revelations of 
his true identity will influence any determination.  See id.  If an author defends himself 
vigilantly against revelation, he will win; if he placidly tolerates revelation and then 
protests, he will lose.  See id.  Cf. supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 166 See Granz, 198 F.2d at 588; Geisel, 295 F. Supp. at 354. 
 167 Drummond v. Altemus, 60 F. 338, 339 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1894). 
 168 Id. at 338 (“That such right exists is too well settled, upon reason and authority.”).  
See also Clemens, 14 F. at 731 (finding an author “may restrain another from the 
publication of literary matter purporting to have been written by him, but which, in fact, 
was never so written”); Lord Byron v. Johnston, 35 Eng. Rep. 851 (Ch. 1816). 
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attributed to the author.169  In such scenarios, the right was 
independent of copyright: it was enforceable whether or not the 
author still held a copyright in the work.170 
During the twentieth century, these independent author’s rights 
were absorbed by the common law of unfair competition.171  False 
attribution is the classic case of falsely passing-off goods as those 
of another.  Accordingly, the author can pursue an unfair 
competition claim under the Lanham Act Section 43(a), or under 
state law for the misrepresentation of the work’s origin when the 
attribution is absolutely false, inaccurately describes his role, or the 
work is substantially altered.172  In addition, the author can pursue 
a state law tort claim for defamation or invasion of privacy.173 
 
 169 See Drummond, 60 F. at 338-39; Lord Byron, 35 Eng. Rep. At 851.  Both cases 
involved works containing some material created by the respective author, but designated 
as being completely by that author. 
 170 See, e.g., Drummond, 60 F. at 338-39; Clemens, 14 F. at 730-31. 
 171 See, e.g., Granz, 198 F.2d 588; Yameta, 279 F. Supp. at 585; Samuelson v. 
Producer’s Distrib. Co., 1 Ch. 201 (1931). 
 172 See Geisel, 295 F. Supp. at 353; Yameta, 279 F. Supp. at 585 (finding a violation 
of the Lanham Act where packaging and advertising gave the false impression that Jimi 
Hendrix was the primary artist, when in fact he only provided background 
accompaniment).  See infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text. 
 173 When an infringing work is of inferior quality and therefore threatens the author’s 
reputation, he can sue for defamation.  See, e.g., Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis & Co., 168 
N.E.2d 643 (1960), appeal denied 174 N.E.2d 609 (1961); Ben-Oliel v. Press Publ’g Co., 
167 N.E. 432 (1929). 
  The author might also invoke a tort claim for invasion of privacy.  See, e.g., Follet 
v. Arbor House Publ’g Co., 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Eliot v. Jones, 120 N.Y.S. 
989 (Sup. Ct. 1910), aff’d 125 N.Y.S. 1119 (1st Dep’t 1910).  The right to privacy 
incorporates four torts: 1) an intrusion upon a person’s solitude, 2) a publication placing 
person in a false light, 3) a public disclosure of private facts, and 4) appropriation of a 
person’s name or likeness.  SCHECHTER, supra note 125, at 125. 
  For false attribution to a work he did not create, an author can make a claim under 
the “false light” theory, based on a “misappropriation of the unique personal 
characteristics of the author and the unflattering exposure of these characteristics to the 
public.”  Deborah Ross, Comment, The United States Joins the Berne Convention: New 
Obligations for Moral Rights?, 68 N.C. L. REV. 363, 377 (1990).  Two cases involving 
garbled or mimicked presentations of musicians’ works found violations based generally 
on this theory.  Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (using a 
double to mimic Bette Midler’s voice in Ford’s television advertisements); Big Seven 
Music Corp. v. Lennon, 554 F.2d 504, 512 (2d Cir. 1977) (record company sold “fuzzy” 
copies of John Lennon’s works).  Such a finding entitles the author to an injunction.  See 
Midler, 849 F.2d at 460. 
  When a person is misrepresented as the author of a work to which he has a 
connection but that he did not personally create, he can base his claim on the “public 
disclosure of private facts” theory of invasion of privacy.  Zim v. West Publ’g Co., 573 
F.2d 1318, 1326-27 (5th Cir. 1978).  In Zim the publisher of science books originally 
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2.  Continental Law 
Both French and German copyright law grant an author the right 
to prevent the use of his name in connection with a substantially 
altered work.174  However, neither country’s law protects the right 
to prevent attribution for a work the author did not create.  This 
right is protected by the more general “law of personality,” similar 
in some respects to the common law right to privacy.175 
V.  THE RIGHT OF INTEGRITY 
The right of integrity is often considered the most essential 
element of moral rights.176  The right of integrity protects two 
interrelated concerns: 1) the author’s interest in preserving the 
integrity of his work, and 2) the author’s interest in preserving his 
reputation — a major factor in the marketability of his works.177  
Berne recognizes this dichotomous purpose by granting the author 
the right to 1) “object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of . . . the . . . work,” that 2) “would be prejudicial to 
his honor or reputation.”178  Thus, Berne’s right of integrity 
 
authored by Zim published and sold a revision of the books naming Zim as the author 
without first obtaining the author’s consent.  The elements of “public disclosure of private 
facts” are: 1) publication of private information (i.e., the plaintiff’s name), and 2) a 
reasonable person would object to such publication. 
  Finally, an author could rely on the “right to publicity.”  The right to publicity 
“protects against the unauthorized commercial use of a person’s name, likeness or other 
personal attributes in a way that causes commercial damage to the plaintiff.”  SCHECHTER, 
supra note 125, at 125.  Actionable causes have included: 1) the imitation of a performer’s 
voice, Midler, 849 F.2d at 460; 2) the use of celebrity doubles, Allen v. National Video, 
Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); and 3) the unauthorized appropriation and 
broadcast of a circus performer’s act, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 
562 (1977) (filming and broadcast of human cannonball’s act without his consent could 
harm his ability to earn a living). 
 174 See DaSilva, supra note 143, at 28.  See also DIETZ, supra note 15, at 99, 116-126. 
 175 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 117-19.  Continental lawyers consider that this right 
protects the author qua author instead of protecting his work of authorship.  The 
American and Continental systems are both premised on protecting authors’ specific 
interests in their works.  Copyright law does not apply to general questions of honor, 
privacy or reputation. 
 176 See STROWEL, supra note 99, at 479. 
 177 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 111.  An author’s expression — the work — is a 
reflection of the author’s personality — his experiences, education, and personal and 
professional integrity.  A mutilation or malevolent alteration of the work will reflect 
poorly on the author.  See, e.g., supra notes 205-24 and accompanying text. 
 178 Berne, supra note 95, at art. 6bis(1). 
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requires an alteration to be sufficiently substantial to prejudice the 
author’s honor or reputation to be actionable. 
A.  United States Law 
American copyright law recognizes no right of integrity per se.  
But the Copyright Act, the Common Law, and Section 43 (a) of the 
Lanham Act provide a number of protections for the right of 
integrity. 
1.  The Copyright Act 
a.  Prohibition of Copying 
For 250 years, the prohibition of copying another’s work has 
also served to protect the integrity of a work in Common Law 
copyright systems.  In addition to protecting the whole work, the 
Copyright Act protects against any unauthorized use of a 
substantial part of the work. 
American courts have traditionally followed British precedent 
that any use of a “substantial part of the work” constitutes 
copyright infringement.179  Citing numerous British cases, Justice 
Story held in 1841 that: 
 
 179 See Cooper v. Stevens, 1 Ch. 567 (1895).  Beginning in the mid-eighteenth 
century, British courts distinguished between valid abridgements of a work and 
alterations that infringed the copyright.  See, e.g., Gyles v. Wilcox, 22 Eng. Rep. 586 (Ch. 
1740); Bell v. Walker, 28 Eng. Rep. 1235 (Ch. 1785); Butterworth v. Robinson, 31 Eng. 
Rep. 817 (Ch. 1801).  A “true and proper abridgement” existed when an author invested 
his own labor, skill, judgment, and expression to convey the sense of another author’s 
work without using the substance of the other’s work.  VII R.C. CASES, supra note 54, at 
94.  An infringing use was found when an author made only a “colourable abridgement,” 
meaning he copied the substance of another’s work rather than investing a high degree of 
labor, skill, and judgment to create a new work.  VII R.C. CASES, supra note 54, at 94.  A 
use that communicated “the same knowledge” as the original work was “an actionable 
violation of literary property.”  See Folsom, 9 Fed. Cas. at 348 (quoting Roworth v. 
Wilkes, 170 Eng. Rep 889 (1894).  The intent of the abridger was immaterial: “it is 
enough, that the publication . . . is in substance a copy, whereby a work vested in another 
is prejudiced.”  Id.  Thus, the quality of the material used, not the quantity, was the key 
factor.  In Cooper v. Stevens, the Court of Chancery found a single illustration from a 
book of designs a “substantial part of the work” and held the defendant liable for using it.  
1 Ch. 567 (1895). 
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It is certainly not necessary, to constitute an 
invasion of copyright, that the whole of a work 
should be copied, or even a large portion of it, in 
form or in substance.  If so much is taken, that the 
value of the original is sensibly diminished, or the 
labors of the original author are substantially to an 
injurious extent appropriated by another, that is 
sufficient, in point of law, to constitute a piracy pro 
tanto.  The entirety of the copyright is the property 
of the author; and it is no defence, that another 
person has appropriated a part, and not the whole, 
of any property.180 
In short, the quantity taken does not determine the outcome.181  
More important is the quality, the “value of the materials taken[] 
and the importance of it to the sale of the original work.”182  For 
example, a “reviewer may . . . cite largely from the original 
work . . . for the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism” but not 
“to supersede the use of the original work.”183  And a fair 
abridgement is not the “facile use of the scissors; or extracts of the 
essential parts, constituting the chief value of the original work.”184  
It “must be [a] real, substantial condensation of the materials, and 
intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon.”185 
These rules on abridgments are now incorporated into the fair 
use exception of the Copyright Act.186  But the level of protection 
is essentially the same: “a use that supplants any part of the normal 
market for a copyrighted work would ordinarily be considered an 
infringement.”187  In order “to negate fair use one need only show 
 
 180 Folsom, 9 Fed. Cas. at 348. 
 181 See id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 344-45. 
 184 Id. at 345. 
 185 Id. 
 186 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1997).  See also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550 (“As 
[Folsom v. Marsh] illustrates, the fair use doctrine has always precluded a use that 
‘supersede[s] the use of the original.’”).  See supra note 74. 
 187 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (citing Senate Report).  The fair use test is more 
complex than the factors weighed in the earlier abridgement cases.  The fair use factors 
are: 1) the purpose and character of the use; 2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 3) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used; and 4) the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (1997).  The 
major emphasis of fair use is on the effect of the use on the market value of the original 
work.  Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.  Cf. supra notes 180-185 and accompanying text. 
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that if the challenged use ‘should become widespread, it would 
adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.’”188  
If someone appropriates the author’s labors for profit, he will 
normally affect the market value of the author’s work.  Moreover, 
the potential impact on the market for derivative works must also 
be considered.189 
b.  Derivative Works 
Section 106(2) of the Copyright Act grants the copyright owner 
the sole right to produce “derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work.”190  A derivative work is “based upon one or 
more preexisting works . . . [that] may be recast, transformed, or 
adapted[; a] work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, 
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an 
original work of authorship.”191 
When someone has the right to make a derivative work, he must 
“give appropriate expression to the theme, thought, and main 
action”, i.e., substance of the original.192  The copyright for the 
authorized derivative work extends only to “the novel additions 
made to the underlying [original] work and the derivative work 
does not affect the ‘force or validity’ of the copyright” in the 
original work.193  As a result, a party that has rights to adapt a 
derivative work cannot exceed the permission granted by the 
author or owner of the original copyright when it makes the 
derivative work.194 
An unauthorized derivative work is a copyright infringement if it 
“incorporate[s] a portion of the copyrighted work in some 
 
 188 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)). 
 189 See id. 
 190 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1997). 
 191 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1997). 
 192 Curwood v. Affiliated Distribs., Inc., 283 F. 219, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1922) 
(“elaboration of a story means something other than that [the storyline] should be 
discarded, and its title and authorship applied to a wholly dissimilar tale”). 
 193 Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 20. 
 194 See id.  For example, if a “copyright owner of an underlying work limits his consent 
for its use in a derivative work to a given medium (e.g. opera), the copyright owner of the 
derivative work may not exploit such derivative work in a different medium (e.g. motion 
pictures) to the extent the derivative work incorporates protectible material from the 
underlying work.”  Id. at 20 n.4. 
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form . . . .”195  Thus, a person who prepares a work incorporating 
any portions of the original work without the copyright owner’s 
consent infringes on the copyright “whether or not prejudicial to 
the author’s reputation.”196 
c.  Conclusion 
The provisions of the Copyright Act regarding fair use and 
derivative works prevent a violation of the right of integrity.  Any 
unauthorized use of a key portion or of the substance of a work 
will be an infringement of the copyright in that work, unless such 
infringement falls under fair use or another specific exception. 
These provisions effectively protect the author’s right to 
integrity versus third parties.  With regard to the rights of the 
author vis-à-vis his publisher, however, the right to integrity 
provided by the Copyright Act is limited.  The publisher is 
authorized to make use of the original work.  Because the rights in 
Section 106 are divisible, the author can enforce his right to 
integrity against a publisher who prepares an unauthorized 
derivative work.197  In the case of an absolute transfer of copyright, 
however, an infringing derivative work would infringe the 
copyright owner’s, rather than the author’s, right.  The author’s 
right to prevent non-consensual alterations after a transfer or 
licensing of the copyright would depend largely on the language of 
the contract or on alternative common law and statutory causes of 
action. 
2.  The Predominance of Contract Law 
Under the traditional rule, an author has no right to prevent 
alteration if he did not reserve the right to integrity at the time of 
contracting, i.e.,: the author’s “so-called ‘moral right’ is controlled 
by the law of contract.”198  Thus, if the author contractually grants 
 
 195 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, reprinted in 17 U.S.C. at 909 (1994).   
 196 See Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne 
Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 554 (1986).   
 197 Prior to 1976 the copyright was not divisible.  HORACE G. BALL, LAW OF 
COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 46-47 (1944).  This principle weakened the 
author’s control over the uses of his work. 
 198 Edison v. Viva Int’l, Ltd., 421 N.Y.S.2d 203, 206 (1st Dep’t. 1979).  See also Seroff 
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a transferee or licensee the right to make changes to his work, he 
cannot later hinder such alterations;199 the author can, however, 
expressly reserve the right to prevent changes.200  But minimal 
changes to modernize the work201 or which are necessary to 
present the work in another, author-approved, medium might be 
permitted without the author’s consent.202  For example, a film 
producer did not have the right to enjoin Columbia from inserting 
commercials into the television versions of his films, although the 
contract reserved to him the right to approve all final edits.203 
This traditional rule is not, however, absolute.  Where a contract 
is silent regarding alterations, “the parties will be deemed to have 
adopted the custom prevailing in the [particular] trade or 
industry.”204  Thus, unreasonable changes that are not required by 
the medium in which the work is presented or that exceed industry 
practices are not preempted by the contract. 
3.  Unfair Competition 
Consequently, a publisher does not have the right to make 
changes that unreasonably alter the substance of a work.  When 
“the use being made of her literary production [is] such as to injure 
the reputation of the work and of the author” and amounts to a 
deception of the public, the author can make a claim under unfair 
competition.205  When the publisher uses the author’s name to sell 
 
v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 162 N.Y.S.2d 770, 775 (Sup. Ct. 1957), aff’d, 210 N.Y.S.2d 479 
(1st Dep’t 1960), appeal denied, 21 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1st Dep’t 1961); Crimi v. Rutgers 
Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 819 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (“The time for the artist to have 
reserved any rights was when he and his attorney participated in the drawing of the contract 
with the church.”). 
 199 See, e.g., Seroff, 162 N.Y.S.2d at 770; Dreiser v. Paramount Publix Corp., 22 
COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. 106 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Jones v. Am. Law Book Co., 109 N.Y.S. 706 
(1st Dep’t 1908). 
 200 See, e.g., Manners v. Famous Players-Lasky Corp., 262 F. 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); 
Royle v. Dillingham, 104 N.Y.S. 783 (Sup. Ct. 1907); Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1392 
n.10 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 828, (1993) (an author may insure “‘quality 
control and high standards in the exploitation’ of her creative work”) (quoting Clifford Ross 
Co. v. Nelvana, Ltd., 710 F. Supp. 517, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). 
 201 See Edgar Rice Burroughs, Inc. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 14 (Ct. 
App. 1962).  See also NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8D.04(A)(1). 
 202 See NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8D.04(A)(1).  See also Manners, 262 F. at 811. 
 203 See Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1966), aff’d 
269 N.Y.S.2d 913 (1st Dep’t 1966), aff’d 219 N.E.2d 431 (1966). 
 204 Id. at 598. 
 205 Prouty v. NBC, 26 F. Supp. 265, 266 (D. Mass. 1939). 
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a “garbled version” of a work that “substantially departs from the 
original,” he is giving the false impression that he is actually 
selling the author’s work and is guilty of unfair competition.206  
The unfair competition will usually be evident and automatic, since 
the use of the author’s name will almost always deceive the public 
that it is the author’s work.207  The result is that the question in an 
unfair competition case ultimately comes down to the standard for 
the right of integrity under Berne: whether a use is injurious to the 
work and reputation of the author.208 
Thus, in a case where commercials would “so alter, adversely 
affect or emasculate the artistic or pictorial quality of [a] motion 
picture so as to destroy or distort materially or substantially the 
mood, effect, or continuity of [the] motion picture as produced and 
directed by” the author, a court will issue an injunction to prevent 
the broadcast of the film on television.209  The broadcaster “must 
give primary consideration” to these concerns, even if no 
contractual relationship exists between the author and the 
broadcaster and the author no longer holds the copyright for the 
film.210 
In line with the common law application of unfair competition, 
and consistent with the underlying purpose of Section 43(a), the 
Lanham Act grants an author a right to protect his interest in the 
integrity of his work.211  In Gilliam v. ABC, the Second Circuit 
determined that Section 43(a) applies when a work crediting an 
author has been altered “into a form that departs substantially from 
the original work” without the author’s consent.212  Furthermore, 
the court found that Monty Python had a viable claim for the 
 
 206 See Granz, 198 F.2d at 589 (Frank, J., concurring). 
 207 See Yameta, 279 F. Supp. at 587 (holding that advertising and selling records that 
gave impression that Jimi Hendrix was the primary performer misled the public). 
 208 See Prouty, 26 F. Supp. at 266.   See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 209 Stevens v. NBC, 148 U.S.P.Q. 755, 758 (Cal. 1966).   
 210 See id. 
 211 See Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (the court based its decision on the many cases 
protecting an author’s business or personal reputation where the representation of a product 
“creates a false impression of the product’s origin” under both the Lanham Act and other 
causes of action).  See supra note 139 for the text of the Lanham Act § 43(a) (prohibiting an 
act that will “deceive as to . . . origin, sponsorship, or approval,” or that “misrepresents the 
nature” of, the goods).  See supra notes 128-130, 205-207 and accompanying text. 
 212 538 F.2d at 24-25 (“an allegation that a defendant has presented to the public a 
‘garbled,’ distorted version of plaintiff’s work seeks to redress the very rights sought to be 
protected by the Lanham Act . . .”). 
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“mutilation” of its work.213  The court reasoned that authors must 
be able to prevent “the mutilation or misrepresentation of their 
work,” because to hold otherwise would contradict “the economic 
incentive . . . that serves as the foundation of American copyright 
law.”214  Under Section 43(a), an author can “vindicate [his] 
personal right to prevent the presentation of his work to the public 
in a distorted form.”215 
On the other hand, Gilliam implies that the sale of a substantially 
altered work without the author’s name generally will not give rise 
to a claim of unfair competition, since it would not be harmful to 
the reputation and honor of the author.  Such a sale could, 
however, violate the terms of the publishing contract, expressly or 
implicitly.216  But if the public recognizes the work as that of the 
author, in spite of the omission of the author’s name, the public 
actually will be deceived that it is his work and the publisher could 
be held liable for defamation or invasion of privacy.217 
4.  Other Claims 
Under certain circumstances, the author can sue for defamation 
when his work has been altered, even if he has transferred the 
copyright.  For example, in the 1832 case Archbold v. Sweet, a 
publisher issued a revised edition of an author’s work under the 
author’s name without his consent.218  In holding the publisher 
liable for defamation, the court reasoned that the new edition 
contained substantial and incorrect alterations that injured the 
author’s reputation.219  Like their English counterparts, American 
courts have also recognized an author’s right to a defamation claim 
for a materially altered work injurious to his reputation.220 
Moreover, if a contract provides that an author’s name shall be 
used in connection with the work, the sale of a substantially altered 
 
 213 See id. at 24. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. 
 216 See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text. 
 217 Actual confusion is required for defamation.  Gardella, 89 F.2d at 896.  A libel 
occurs when a reasonable person recognizes that the plaintiff is the subject of the 
defamation.  See supra notes 173-380 and accompanying text. 
 218 174 Eng. Rep. 55 (N.P. 1832). 
 219 See id. at 57. 
 220 See, e.g., Edison , 421 N.Y.S.2d at 207. 
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work will constitute a breach of contract:221 “the established rule is 
that, even if the contract with the artist expressly authorizes 
reasonable modifications . . . it is an actionable wrong to hold out 
the artist as author of a version which substantially departs from 
the original.”222  The harm to the plaintiff’s reputation and the 
difficulty in determining damages can also warrant injunctive 
relief.223  Although copyright law entitles the copyright holder to 
publish the work without attribution, he will be liable to the author 
for a breach of contract if he omits the author’s name.224 
B.  Continental Law 
1.  General 
Under French and German copyright law, the right of integrity is 
tempered by practical economic concerns.  The laws in both 
countries require an author to accept reasonable, good faith 
alterations necessitated by the medium in which the work is 
presented.  In essence, only unauthorized and unreasonable 
changes to the substance of the work will incur liability.  Thus, the 
degree of protection is similar to the degree provided by American 
law.225 
a.  France 
The right of integrity in France is protected by Article 6 of the 
copyright law which states that, “the author enjoys the right of 
respect for . . . his authorship and his work.”226  This right applies 
 
 221 See Granz, 198 F.2d at 588 (holding that sale of records where one-fourth of the 
work was deleted, constituted breach of contract); Packard v. Fox Film Corp., 202 N.Y.S. 
164 (1st Dep’t 1923) (finding that the unauthorized alteration of the title “was a distinct 
damage to the plaintiff”). 
 222 Granz, 198 F.2d at 589 (Frank, J., concurring). 
 223 See id. at 588. 
 224 See Clemens, 122 N.Y.S. at 206 (Sup. Ct. 1910). 
 225 See supra notes 179-189, 192-205, 219, 222 and accompanying text. 
 226 Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 6 (“L’auteur 
jouit du droit au respect . . . de sa qualite et de son oeuvre.”).  Article 47, requiring theater 
owners to respect the author’s work, and Article 56, requiring a book publisher to receive 
consent of the author for alterations, also apply.  See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 91. 
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to publishers, owners of original works, and the general public.227  
Furthermore, the French law applies different standards to the 
reproduction or presentation of original works and the adaptation 
of derivative works.228 
 i. Use of Original Works  
French law generally obligates publishers to reproduce and 
present original works faithfully and strictly, including the title and 
any prefaces or introductions.  But French law also takes the 
interests of publishers into account.229  The publisher can make 
changes required by the medium of reproduction.230  A contract 
between the author and the publisher must be interpreted in good 
faith.231  And an author cannot make unreasonable demands based 
solely on his moral right.232 
In cases of controversy, the court interprets the meaning and 
scope of a contract.233  An author has the right to decide when to 
sue for a violation of the integrity right, but the court makes the 
final determination whether or not a violation has occurred — the 
burden is on the plaintiff to prove a violation of the right.234   
Furthermore, substantial editing of, or additions to, a work will 
cause liability but will not usually entitle the author to have the 
work confiscated or have its distribution enjoined.235  A publisher 
 
 227 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 92. 
 228 See id. at 99. 
 229 See id. 
 230 See id. 
 231 See id.  See infra text accompanying note 232. 
 232 See Lichtenstein v. KS Visions, Cass. civ. 1re, Mar. 19, 1996, 1996 Bull. Civ. I, 
No. 137.  In Lichtenstein, a contract determined that the work should be tailored to the 
custom and usage of the medium.  The author created a work substantially longer than 
specified and refused to shorten the work based on her moral right to integrity.  The 
publisher made a good faith effort to market the work, but could not.  The court then held 
that the author could not demand specific performance of the contract. 
 233 See id.   
 234 See Collet & Bartoli v. Blaise, Cass. civ. 1re, Jan. 17, 1995, 1995 Bull. Civ. I, No. 
39.  Thus, although the right to integrity is technically a subjective right, i.e., the author-
subject has the right to decide if his integrity is impinged, the final determination is an 
objective evaluation made by the court. 
 235 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 102.  In Blanchar, the producer cut large portions of a 
film for commercial reasons.  The court awarded damages to the director, screenwriter 
and composer of the film for a violation of the right of integrity.  In Prévert & Carné, the 
court awarded damages to the director and screenwriter on the same grounds, but refused 
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also has the express right to make corrections for grammatical 
errors and to edit passages offending public morals.236  If the 
author refuses to allow such changes, the publisher can withdraw 
from the contract.237 
 ii. Creation of Derivative Works 
The French law grants greater flexibility for derivative works.  
By its nature, a derivative work requires independent creative 
effort by the adapter and requires an alteration of an original 
work.238  Thus, the technological nature of the medium and the 
creative rights of the adapter should be evaluated when judging 
alterations.239  Changes that are necessary to the adaptation will be 
allowed as long as the substance of the work is not harmed.240 
The courts must seek a fair balancing of interests between the 
contracting parties when ruling on the propriety of a derivative 
work.241  Courts will evaluate changes to the work objectively, not 
solely on the subjective opinion of the author, even when a 
contract provides that the underlying nature of the original work 
cannot be altered.242  Thus, as long as a motion picture adaptation 
of a book maintains the essential substance of the book, the 
addition, e.g., of a happy ending, will not violate the right of 
integrity.243  The author’s contractual consent to changes will 
usually be enforced — only malicious changes will cause an injury 
 
to enjoin and confiscate the film.  In Charlie Chaplin, the court found that the 
unauthorized addition of a musical score to the film “The Kid” breached the right of 
integrity and awarded damages.  Id. 
 236 See id. 
 237 See id. 
 238 See Bernstein v. Société Pathé-cinéma, Trib. civ., Seine, July 26, 1933, D.H. 1933, 
533.  See also DIETZ, supra note 15, at 101. 
 239 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 105-06. 
 240 See id. 
 241 See Richepin v. Rivers, Trib. civ. de la Seine, Apr. 12, 1937, G.P. 1937, 2, 243. 
 242 See Le don d’Adéle (Barillet v. Société Burgus Films), Trib. civ. de Bordeaux, Jan. 
15, 1951, G.P. 1951, 1, 372; Le Lieutenant de Gibraltar (Frondaie v. Compagnie Indust. 
Et Commerciale Cinématographique), Trib. civ. de la Seine, Jan. 12, 1955, RIDA No. 
VIII, 104 (1955) (detailing criteria designed to evaluate the propriety of changes: 1) 
faithfulness to the underlying plot; 2) faithfulness to the flow of the plot; 3) faithfulness 
to the author’s basic idea; 4) faithfulness to the psychological elements of the work; and, 
5) changes required by medium of exploitation).  See also DIETZ, supra note 15, at 105. 
 243 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 101. 
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to the author’s reputation and trigger liability.244  But where the 
author reserves extensive rights of control, he can void the contract 
when alterations exceed his consent.245 
 iii. Conclusion 
Thus, there is no absolute principle determining the outcome of 
integrity cases in French law.  Reduced to its essence, French law 
makes an equitable evaluation of the facts and balances the 
interests of authors, publishers, and the public on a case-by-case 
basis.246 
b.  Germany 
German copyright law has a number of provisions regarding the 
integrity of the work.  Section 14 of the German law provides the 
author with the general right to prevent “any distortion or any other 
mutilation of [the] work which would prejudice [the author’s] 
lawful intellectual or personal interests in the work.”247  The statute 
also stipulates that a licensee may not alter a work, its title, or the 
designation of the author in the absence of the author’s consent.248  
But the German law also provides that the author is bound by good 
faith to accept necessary alterations.249  The law makes no 
distinction between original and derivative works, thereby 
indicating that any alterations made necessary by the authorized 
use of the work are allowed. 
The terms used in the German provisions on the right to integrity 
— ”justified interests,” “consent,” “good faith,” “necessary 
 
 244 See Bernstein v. Société Pathé-cinéma, Trib. civ., Seine, July 26, 1933, D.H. 1933, 
533.  Cf. note 220 and accompanying text. 
 245 See Richepin v. Rivers, Trib. civ. de la Seine, Apr. 12, 1937, G.P. 1937, 2, 243.  
Under American contract law, an author could rescind the contract if the publisher failed 
to perform essential conditions of the contract.  See also BALL, supra note 197, at 591 
(noting that under U.S. contract law, an author could rescind the contract if the publisher 
failed to perform essential conditions of the contract). 
 246 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 115.  And the remedy available to the author might be 
limited even when a violation is found.  See also supra notes 149-152 and accompanying 
text. 
 247 FRG, supra note 89, art. 14. 
 248 See id. art. 39(1). 
 249 See id. art. 39(2). 
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alterations,” “interests of others” — clarify that the author’s right 
to integrity is limited.  And the custom and usage of the respective 
industry must also be taken into account.250  German courts 
determine whether a violation has occurred by objectively 
balancing the interests and evaluating the particular circumstances 
on a case-by-case basis251 — the “author’s interests should be 
weighed against possibly opposing equally justified interests.”252 
2.  Motion Pictures and Public Performances 
Both Continental systems contain special provisions for public 
performances and motion pictures.  In France, for example, theater 
directors are strictly required to present a work faithfully, but they 
have a certain degree of their own artistic and creative freedom 
when presenting the work.253  German law grants performers the 
right to prohibit any distortion or alteration of their performances 
that would injure their honor or reputation as performers, but 
requires that they take the interests of the other performers into 
account.254 
With regard to motion pictures, moral rights essentially prevent 
only unauthorized, unreasonable changes, and thus, these 
protections would not seem to differ significantly from their 
counterparts for motion pictures in the United States.255  French 
and German law consider the director, the screenwriter, and the 
score-composer of a film the authors of the picture.256  Under 
French law, they can exercise their moral rights individually or 
collectively, but they cannot exercise a right against each other to 
 
 250 See STROWEL, supra note 80, at 534 (citing EUGEN ULMER, URHEBER-UND 
VERLAGSRECHT, at 210, 218 (6th ed. 1987). 
 251 See id. (citing ULMER, supra note 250, at 216).  See also Strömholm II, supra note 
5, at 60.  
 252 Strömholm II, supra note 5, at 60. 
 253 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 100.  But when an entire scene is cut from an opera, a 
court will award minimal compensation to the set designer.  See Léger v. Réunion des 
Théatres Lyriques Nationaux, Trib. civ. de la Seine, Oct. 15, 1954, RIDA No. VI, 146 
(1955). 
 254 See FRG, supra note 89, art. 83(1), (2) (“If a work is performed by a group of 
performers, each one in the exercise of this right must take into account the legitimate 
interests of the others.”). 
 255 See supra notes 205-15 and accompanying text. 
 256 See Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 14. 
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prevent the completion of the film.257  The “anarchic exercise” of 
moral rights by individuals does not comport with the nature of a 
film as a collaboration.258  German law also restrains the authors’ 
rights for motion pictures — they can protest only gross distortion 
or injury to their work and must take the interests of other 
contributors as well as of the producer into account.259  Thus, 
Continental laws balance the interests of the parties involved when 
determining a violation of the right to integrity for movies. 
VI.  SPECIAL PROTECTION OF VISUAL ART 
A.  United States Law 
1.  Visual Artists Rights Act 
In spite of the widespread American opposition to moral rights, 
in 1990 Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act (hereinafter 
“VARA”).260  VARA grants the right of attribution, the right of 
integrity and a limited right to prevent destruction with respect to 
works of “visual art.”261  The duration of these rights is limited to 
the life of the author.262  Under VARA, “visual art” means a 
painting, drawing, print or sculpture existing in at least one original 
and at most two hundred signed and numbered copies.263  The 
same applies to still photographs produced solely for the purpose 
of exhibition.264  Numerous other works are excluded specifically 
from VARA’s reach.265  VARA applies only to works 1) whose 
 
 257 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 102, citing the case of Prévert & Grimault, Cour cass. 
civ., Apr. 13, 1959, D. 1959, 225. 
 258 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 104. 
 259 See FRG, supra note 89, art. 93. 
 260 Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1997)). 
 261 See id. § 106A(a). 
 262 See id. § 106A(d). 
 263 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1997). 
 264 See id. 
 265 See id. (“A work of visual art does not include — (A)(i) any poster, map, globe, 
chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual 
work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, 
electronic publication, or similar publication; (ii) any merchandising item or advertising, 
promotional, descriptive, covering, or packaging material or container.”). 
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title was not transferred prior to, or 2) that were created after, June 
21, 1991, the date that VARA entered into force.266  Works that 
were altered before VARA took effect are excluded from its 
protections also.267 
The rights provided by VARA exist independently of the 
exclusive rights of Copyright Act Section 106.268  Not only does 
VARA allow the author to assert the right “to claim authorship.”269  
It also grants the author the right to “to prevent the use of his or her 
name” on a work the author did not create270 or in the event of a 
“distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which 
would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation . . . .”271  The 
Act does not provide a right to remain anonymous or use a 
pseudonym.272 
With regards to integrity, an author can personally prevent “any 
intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of [the] 
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or 
reputation . . . .”273  He also has the right to prevent the destruction 
of “a work of recognized stature” incorporated into a building, 
whether or not the destruction injures the author’s honor or 
reputation.274  These rights to prevent alteration or destruction are, 
however, limited by Section 113(d) of the Copyright Act.275  
Furthermore, destruction of a work must be intentional or grossly 
 
 266 See Visual Artists Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. VI, § 610 (declaring VARA 
to become effective 6 months after passage).  See also Waiver, supra note 130, at 112. 
 267 See id.  See also Pavia v. 1120 Avenue of the Ams. Assocs., 901 F. Supp. 620, 626 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 268 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(2)(1997). 
 269 Id. § 106A(a)(1)(A). 
 270 Id. § 106A(a)(1)(B). 
 271 Id. § 106A(a)(2). 
 272 See Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal 
System of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 947, 960 
(1990). 
 273 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A). 
 274 Id. at §§ 106A(a)(3)(B), 113(d)(1). 
 275 See 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(B) (in the case of works that cannot be removed from a 
building without violating the provisions regarding integrity and destruction, the author can 
consent to a “violation” of the integrity right).  Absent a signed, written consent, the 
removal of works installed after the passage of VARA violates § 106(A)(a).  See Carter v. 
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d and vacated in part and 
aff’d in part by 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).  For works that can be removed without altering 
or destroying the work, the owner of the building can remove the work if he made a 
diligent, good faith effort to notify the author 90 days prior to the removal in order to allow 
the author to remove or pay for the removal of the work.  17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2). 
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negligent to be actionable.276 
The rights contained in VARA are personal to the author and 
may not be transferred.277  The rights can, however, be waived by 
the author in a signed, written instrument.278  The instrument must 
specifically identify the work and the uses of that work that are to 
be covered by the waiver.279  A mere transfer in ownership of the 
work does not constitute a waiver of the author’s rights.280  Thus, 
unless waived, the author’s VARA rights remain vested in the 
work no matter how often ownership is transferred. 
A broad limitation of the scope of the act results from the 
exclusion of “works made for hire”.  As with the copyright, the 
rights rest with the employer.281 
VARA generally adopts the remedies of the Copyright Act with 
the exception of criminal penalties.282  Besides criminal claims, the 
Copyright Act permits claims for injunctions,283 impoundment or 
disposal of infringing articles,284 actual damages,285 lost profits,286 
and costs and attorney’s fees.287 
2.  State Statutes 
Ten American states have also passed moral rights legislation for 
visual arts prior to the passage of VARA.  These statutes can be 
categorized into three models: the preservation model, the moral 
rights model, and the public works model.288  All of the statutes 
 
 276 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B). 
 277 See id. § 106A(a)(e)(1). 
 278 See id. 
 279 See id. 
 280 See id. § 106A(a)(e)(2). 
 281 See id. § 101. 
 282 See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). 
 283 See id. § 502. 
 284 See id. § 503. 
 285 See id. § 504(a). 
 286 See id. 
 287 See id. § 505. 
 288 The preservation model protects an author’s rights of attribution and integrity and 
prohibits the destruction of artistic works under certain circumstances.  California, 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania have the preservation model.  See Waiver, 
supra note 130, at 11-14.  In 1979, California enacted the first moral rights legislation in 
the United States by passing the California Art Preservation Act to serve “the dual 
purpose of protecting the artist’s reputation and of protecting the public interest in 
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cover only fine art or “visual or graphic works.”289 
VARA preempts state law causes of action based on a violation 
of rights equivalent to those of VARA, if the violation occurred 
after the passage of VARA.290  Works not covered by, and rights 
not granted by VARA, “are not preempted, even when they relate 
to works covered by [VARA,]”291 and the state laws remain 
effective for violations committed before VARA went into effect.  
Preemption determinations are made on a case-by-case basis.292  
As one court stated, the preemption issue “will occupy courts for 
years to come.”293 
B.  Continental Law 
As in the United States, Continental law first applied the moral 
right of integrity to works of visual art.294  The German decision of 
Felseiland mit Sirenen (hereinafter “Sirenen”), decided in 1912, 
ushered in the general acceptance of the right of integrity in 
Europe.295  In Sirenen, a house owner altered a fresco that he had 
commissioned from a painter.  The court held this alteration to be a 
violation of the right of integrity.  But the court also indicated that it 
 
preserving the integrity of cultural and artistic creations.”  Id. at 12 (quoting 1 JOHN 
HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 163 
(1987).  The statutes in the other three states are similar to that of California.  Id. at 12-
14.  Under each statute, the artist has a limited right to prevent destruction of his work.  
Id. 
  The moral rights model protects an author’s rights of attribution and integrity to 
varying degrees.  Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New York and Rhode Island follow this 
model. Id. at 14-16. 
  Finally, the public works model gives limited attribution and integrity rights for 
works displayed in public buildings.  New Mexico’s Art in Public Buildings Act is one 
such example of this model.  Id. at 16-17. 
 289 See id. at 11-16. 
 290 See 17 U.S.C. § 301(f) (1997). 
 291 H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 21 (1990). 
 292 See id.  The lack of case law for VARA makes the determination of what rights are 
preempted by it all the more difficult.  Id.  The Final Report of the Register of Copyrights 
expects that a number of state laws will remain effective since they confer rights not 
covered by VARA.  Id.  For example, rights of integrity that do not require a showing of 
“prejudice to honor or reputation” will likely not be preempted.  Id. 
 293 Pavia, 901 F. Supp. at 626 (quoting Charles Ossola, Law for Art’s Sake, THE 
RECORDER, Jan. 8, 1991, at 6). 
 294 See supra notes 260-87 and accompanying text (discussing VARA). 
 295 See Felseiland mit Sirenen, RG (8.6.1912), RGZ 79, 397.  See also DIETZ, supra 
note 15, at 112.  The sphere of influence of this opinion encompassed France.  See id. at 
note 284. 
10:41 PMGUNLICKS.PP7 9/6/01  10:41 PM 
2001] MORAL RIGHTS IN THE WORLDWIDE ECONOMY 647 
 
would have allowed the alteration to stand if no chance existed that 
the work would be seen by the public.  Moreover, it held in dicta 
that complete destruction of a work would not infringe an author’s 
moral right.296  The German copyright law of 1965 adopted a 
similar position on destruction, but the elastic nature of the 
regulation indicates that an author can act against “willful” 
destruction of his work.297  Owners might be required to inform the 
artist of their intention to destroy the work and allow the author a 
chance to remove it.298 
French law also forbids the alteration of an original work of art 
by an owner, although the interests of the owner will be taken into 
account.  Thus, when frescos are painted onto an owner’s private 
property without the knowledge of the owner and he disapproves 
of the work, he may have the right to remove or obliterate the work 
without any notification to the artist.299  In general, however, an 
owner cannot remove or alter an immovable artwork attached to 
his premises without the consent of the author, especially if the 
public has access to the work.300  But if the artwork is not created 
for a specific location, it can be sold and removed without the 
author’s permission.301  After a movable piece of art has been 
made public, any mutilation will entitle the author to damages.302  
But the author cannot demand a return of the work, and damages 
might be minimal.303  Finally, the absolute destruction of a work of 
art will not infringe the right of integrity, because the author’s 
reputation will not be damaged by an exposure of his damaged 
 
 296 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 111-12. 
 297 See id. at 112.  Cf. supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
 298 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 112.  Cf. supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 299 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 113, citing Fresques de Juvisy, Trib. civ. de 
Versailles, June 23, 1932, D.H. 1932, 487 & Paris, Apr. 27, 1934, D.H. 1934, 385.  That 
the defendant was a Catholic bishop might have swayed the court to be more lenient. 
 300 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 114 (citing Les Compagnons de l’Art mural).  See 
also Sudre v. Commune de Baixas, Conseil de Préfecture de Montpellier, Dec. 9, 1937, 
G.P. 1937, 1, 347.  Cf. supra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 301 See Baldaccini c. Ville de Lyon, Trib. civ. de Lyon, Apr. 28, 1997, RIDA No. 173, 
373 (1997). 
 302 See Fersing v. Buffet, Cass. civ. 1re, July 6, 1965, J.C.P. 1965, 14339.  Whether 
the court held that the mutilation violated the right per se, or only that  “the owner cannot 
sell the work without respecting its integrity,” is not entirely clear in the decision. 
 303 In Buffet, the artist received one centime compensation, less than one U.S. cent, 
though it must be added that he did not request more.  Buffet, Cass. civ. 1re, July 6, 1965, 
J.C.P. 1965, 14339. 
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work to the public or third persons.304 
VII.  THE RIGHT TO RETRACT 
A.  United States Law 
The Copyright Act grants a limited right of retraction by 
allowing the author the right to void a contract without cause after 
thirty-five years.305  And under contract law, the author could 
refuse to transfer the work prior to publication.  A court might or 
might not award specific performance — it would depend on the 
facts of the case.306 
B.  Continental Law 
Both French and German law allow an author limited rights to 
refuse to deliver a work prior to, or to retract a work after, 
publication.  But the publisher has rights to recoup any losses that 
the author incurs by his retraction.307 
 
 304 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 111.  Such a conclusion can also be drawn from 
Buffet, depending how one interprets the decision.  See supra text accompanying note 
302. 
 305 See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1997). 
 306 Courts are loathe to enforce specific performance against a party’s will when the 
party has a strong personal interest in the object of the contract.  The law is reluctant to 
deprive an author of his work against his will in almost all cases; only a voluntary 
bankruptcy will justify a taking of the property.  17 U.S.C. § 201(e).  Similar 
considerations might prove persuasive in this context as well.  For example, should the 
court refuse to order specific performance, the author would be required to pay damages. 
 307 In France, the author enjoys an unlimited right to retract, provided that he 
compensates third parties for their incurred losses.  The author must also offer the work 
to the original user under the original conditions should he decide to publish the work at a 
later date. 1 Strömholm III, supra note 30, at 539. 
  Germany has two provisions: one that applies only to publishing contracts, and one 
of general application.  The general provision allows an author to revoke a license 
provided that he compensates the licensee in advance for the costs incurred prior to 
revocation.  But it requires the author to demonstrate that the work no longer represents 
his opinion so that he can “no longer be expected to agree to the exploitation of the 
work.”  FRG, supra note 89, art. 42.  The right cannot be waived and can be invoked by 
the author’s testamentary successor, provided the author was prevented from invoking the 
right during her lifetime.  Strömholm II, supra note 5, at 65.  The specific publishing 
provision grants the right to retract up until the beginning of reproduction, should 
unforeseeable events occur that would have prevented a reasonable author from entering 
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VIII.  COMPATIBILITY OF MORAL RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 
A.  Limited Practical Application of Continental Moral Rights 
An examination of the manner in which France and Germany 
apply moral rights demonstrates that moral rights are not 
inherently anathema to American law.  The absoluteness of moral 
rights and their “overbearing potential” are limited by the public 
interest: “copyright in a capitalist economy must place the greatest 
importance on the transferability and usefulness of the work.”308  
The Continental systems balance the “moral” interests of the 
author with the interests of publishers and the public to achieve 
results that do not differ greatly from American enforcement of 
“moral rights.”  Ergo, individual moral rights are essentially 
compatible with the basic principles of American copyright law. 
B.  Public Rights: Exceptions to Moral Rights 
An examination of the exceptions to moral rights that French 
and German law allow further demonstrates that moral rights are 
limited by the public interest and compatible with American 
copyright law. 
1.  Private Use 
In both France and Germany, members of the public have the 
absolute right to use the work as they wish in private.  Moral rights 
protection vests only when a person makes a public use of the 
work.309 
 
a publishing contract.  The author still must compensate the publisher for all expenses 
and is liable for damages if he publishes the same manuscript elsewhere within a year.  Id 
at 64. 
 308 H. HUBMANN, URHEBER-UND VERLAGSRECHT 27 (6th ed. 1987) (“Das 
Urheberrecht in einer kapitalistischen Wirtschaft muß daher vor allem der 
Verkehrsfähigkeit und Nutzbarkeit des Werkes Rechnung tragen”). 
 309 Only in cases of private use does the French law make an explicit exception 
allowing a work to be used without attribution.  Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., 
Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 41(1) & (2).  Private alteration of works is also permitted, 
unless the altered work is made public or altered for purposes of publication.  Id.; DIETZ, 
supra note 15, at 110.  German law provides that authorship does not have to be 
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2.  Fair Use 
a.  Attribution 
Berne requires that fair uses of a work give credit to the 
source.310  Both French and German law require that any public 
use of the author’s work give credit to the author.311  American law 
makes no such requirement for fair use.  But fair-use practice 
usually respects the right.  Any substantial unauthorized use under 
whatever attribution would usually violate the copyright in the 
work.312  A public use of the author’s work with a false attribution 
would usually constitute reverse passing off.313 
b.  Integrity 
With respect to the right of integrity, French law provides a 
number of fair-use exceptions.  A work can be analyzed and 
quoted in various forms of abridgement such as criticism, review, 
academic presentations, as well as parody.314 
The German law’s chapter making exceptions to copyright 
provides that fair uses under copyright must respect the right of 
integrity; however, mere extracts, as well as necessary, good faith 
alterations are permitted.315 
 
 
acknowledged in cases of private use, free public presentations, and in a limited number 
of other cases.  FRG, supra note 89, art. 63; DIETZ, supra note 15, at 121-22.  The law 
also allows alterations for personal use, except when the altered work is actually or 
intended to be displayed publicly.  DIETZ, supra note 15, at 110, 92-94.  Altered original 
works of art must be kept absolutely private.  See supra notes 295-296 and accompanying 
text. 
 310 See Berne, supra note 21, at arts. 10(3), 10bis(1). 
 311 See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 312 See supra notes 179-89 and accompanying text. 
 313 See supra notes 115-42 and accompanying text. 
 314 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 110, 92-94; Société Microfor v. Le Monde, Cass. ass. 
plén., Oct. 30, 1987, J.O.  No. 8, October 1987, (“Chambres Civiles”) 7. 
 315 See FRG, supra note 89, art. 62(1), (2). 
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C.  Waiver 
Berne does not expressly allow or prohibit waivers of moral 
rights.316  “[O]n the whole, [it] hardly touches on the law of 
contracts.”317  Thus, there is wide variation between Berne member 
states regarding waivers.318  While many states prohibit any waiver 
of moral rights, a number of countries have no specific 
provisions.319  Only Canada allows moral rights to be waived in 
whole or in part, while the United Kingdom allows specific 
waivers.320  Moreover, a number of countries, including France and 
Germany, allow limited implied waivers to the rights of attribution 
and integrity.321 
In American law, VARA allows a waiver, but it must be specific 
and in writing.322  For all other works, a licensing agreement or 
transfer of the copyright can act as an implied waiver of the rights 
of attribution and integrity, but the contractee must execute the 
contract in good faith and give reasonable respect to the name, 
reputation, and work of the author.323  An express waiver will be 
enforced.324 
D.  Works-Made-for-Hire 
France and Germany do not generally apply the work-made-for-
hire doctrine to moral rights.  Only for computer programs created 
in the scope of employment does the work-made-for-hire doctrine 
apply categorically.325  But the laws do allow a number of specific 
exceptions to moral rights for works-made-for-hire.   
For example, the moral rights of the employee are waived in 
favor of the employer in certain circumstances.  In France, moral 
 
 316 See Berne, supra note 95, at art. 6bis.  See also Waiver, supra note 130, at 52. 
 317 NORDEMANN, supra note 100, at 87. 
 318 See Waiver, supra note 130, at 26-56. 
 319 See id.  France, for example, prohibits waivers.  Id. 
 320 See id. at 33-35, 47-51. 
 321 See id. at 54.  See supra notes 148, 161, 165, 230-59 and accompanying text. 
 322 See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
 323 See supra notes 115-142, 179-224 and accompanying text. 
 324 See supra notes 142, 198-203 and accompanying text. 
 325 See Council Directive No. 91/250, art. 2, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42.  Under Article 2 of 
the directive, the employer is considered the author and thus possesses all rights to the 
work. 
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rights automatically belong to the employer for many works made 
for hire.326  In Germany, the employer can reserve some moral 
rights for the work by contract.  And in some instances, German 
law implies the consent of the employee to a waiver.327  Works 
prepared in the normal course of business for the normal business 
purposes of the employer are treated like works-made-for-hire in 
the United States.328  And for motion pictures, German law deems 
the primary authors “to have granted to the producer the exclusive 
right to utilize” the work “in every known manner” and they can 
protest only gross distortions of their contributions.329 
In the United States, the work-made-for-hire doctrine acts as an 
automatic waiver of the copyright, the VARA rights and most of 
the “moral rights” equivalents.330  The employer is considered the 
author and thus possesses all of the author’s rights.331  Berne does 
not prohibit the application of the work-made-for-hire doctrine.  
Before the French copyright law of 1957, French courts applied the 
work-made-for-hire doctrine in a similar fashion to its application 
 
 326 An express contractual transfer of copyright ownership from employee to 
employer is legitimate. STROWEL, supra note 80, at 325-27.  A transfer can be implied 
when the work is performed in the scope of employment and is related directly to the 
employer’s business purpose.  Id. at 326.  And a contractual provision that the copyright 
for all works created by the employee is transferred to the employer can be valid as long 
as it is restricted to works foreseeable in the course of employment.  Bossard v. Rénault, 
Cass. civ. 1re, Feb. 4, 1986, 1986 Bull. Civ. I, No. 12; STROWEL, supra note 80, at 327-28 
(citing Cour de Lyon, Nov. 28, 1991, G.P., Apr. 15-16, 1992, 34).  A contract without 
such a restriction might be valid, but runs the risk of being invalidated as a “global 
transfer” of the rights, which is forbidden by Article 33 of the French law.  Id. at 328. 
  Moreover, the French provisions on collective works provide that the “natural or 
legal person” under whose name a work appears is the owner of all the author’s rights.  
Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 13 (“L’oeuvre 
collective est, sauf preuve contraire, la propriete de la personne physique ou morale sous 
le nom de laquelle elle est divulguee.”).  Provided that that person is responsible for the 
creation of the work, exercises a strong degree of control over its creation, and it is 
impossible to distinguish and attribute the individual contributions.  Id. at art. 9.  These 
are comparable to the factors American courts consider to determine if a work is made 
for hire.  See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
 327 See supra notes 148, 161 and accompanying text. 
 328 See FRG, supra note 89, art. 43.  Some commentators believe that this can occur 
only under an express contract clause, but courts have held that a transfer is implied by 
the employment contract.  STROWEL, supra note 80, at 359. 
 329 FRG, supra note 89, arts. 89.  See also id. art. 93. 
 330 See supra note 288 and accompanying text.  See also Poe, 151 F. Supp. at 801.  
Because some of the equivalent rights are personal to the author, uses of a work that 
prejudice the author’s honor or reputation or which somehow pose unfair competition — 
which is unlikely but possible in an employment relationship — would remain 
actionable. 
 331 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1997). 
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in the United States.332 
E.  Transfer 
Berne determines that the “author shall have” the rights of 
attribution and integrity “[i]ndependently of the author’s economic 
rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights . . . .”333  The 
German law follows this principle inherently, by providing that 
none of the rights to a work is ever really transferred.334  The 
French law provides that the moral rights are “inalienable and 
imprescriptible.”335  The American VARA also provides that the 
moral rights cannot be transferred.336 
American law contains no provision regarding the transfer of 
moral rights for non-VARA works.  Before the property is 
transferred, the rights remain with the author.  After the transfer of 
the copyright, the owner of the copyright owns the aspects of the 
rights covered by copyright law.  The author maintains the rights 
of action outside of copyright law, unless an express or implied 
waiver applies. 
F.  Duration 
French and German law provide different periods of duration for 
moral rights.  German law provides equal duration of seventy years 
after the death of the author for both moral rights and the 
copyright.337  France provides that the moral rights are 
perpetual.338  Upon the author’s death the rights pass to the heirs or 
can be transferred to another by will.339  The French government 
also has a right to make a post-mortem claim.340  Besides France, 
 
 332 See DaSilva, supra note 143, at 28-29 n.195 and accompanying text. 
 333 Berne, supra note 95, at art. 6bis(1). 
 334 See FRG, supra note 89, art. 29.  The Germans employ a compulsory licensing 
system to achieve what other copyright laws achieve by transfer or license after the fact. 
 335 Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 6 (“Ce droit 
est . . . inalienable et imprescriptible.”). 
 336 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1). 
 337 See FRG, supra note 89, art. 64. 
 338 See Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 6. 
 339 See id. 
 340 See Law No. 57-298 of Mar. 11, 1957, J.O., Mar. 14, 1957, p. 2723, art. 20.  See 
also ADOLF DIETZ, COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 185 (1978) 
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the only European Union states granting perpetual moral rights 
protection are Denmark, Italy and Portugal.341  Although these 
perpetuity provisions aim to confirm the supremacy of moral 
rights,342 the ultimate concern behind them is “safeguarding . . . the 
national cultural heritage in the public interest.”343  In his study on 
the possible harmonization of European copyright law, Professor 
Dietz concluded that a perpetual moral right “should be rejected as 
a copyright solution.  The questions involved ought to be dealt 
with outside the field of copyright and within the framework of 
a . . . protection of ancient monuments.”344 
Few countries provide that moral rights are perpetual.345  Article 
6bis of Berne does not prescribe that moral rights are perpetual.  
No international consensus ever emerged to make moral rights 
protection in Berne perpetual.  Article 6bis states only that they 
must last as long as the copyright.  And it allows the rights to 
expire at the death of the author if the national law was such at the 
time of “ratification or accession.”346 
Moreover, notwithstanding the theoretical perpetuity of moral 
rights, French courts have shown a reluctance to enforce them after 
the expiration of the copyright.  In 1997, the Cour de Cassation 
rejected an appeal by the attorney-general of the Paris Court of 
Appeals and held that a painter who copied the work and signature 
of the nineteenth century artist, Toulouse-Lautrec, for sale did not 
violate Toulouse-Lautrec’s moral rights by copying the 
signature.347  In cases where unaffiliated parties brought suit to 
 
(hereinafter “EUROPEAN COMMUNITY”).  See infra note 347 and accompanying text. 
 341 See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EUROPE 101-07, 147-55, 269-76, 355-59 
(George Metaxas-Maranghidis ed., 1995).  See also EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 
340, at 181-83.  All other member states provide that the rights expire at the death of the 
author or with the economic rights.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EUROPE, at 41-51; 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 340, at 183-184. 
 342 See supra notes 353-57 and accompanying text. 
 343 EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, supra note 340, at 183. 
 344 Id. at 188-89. 
 345 See Strömholm II, supra note 5, at 94.  Of those countries having perpetual 
protection, most are in Latin America or traditionally within the French sphere of 
influence. 
 346 Ratification or accession could occur when a state either joins Berne or a state 
already party to Berne ratifies any of the Rome, Brussels, Stockholm or Paris Acts 
amending Berne.  This grandfather clause was a concession to Common Law states 
during the negotiations over the inclusion of Article 6bis in Berne.  STROWEL, supra note 
80, at 509. 
 347 See Le Procureur Général près la Cour d’Appel de Paris v. Sxxxx, Cass. crim., 
June 11, 1997, No. 96-80.388, (Lexis, France Library, Prive file, Biblio).  It was no 
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protect a work after it had fallen into the public domain, the suits 
were dismissed for lack of standing because the consumers 
suffered no direct injury.348 
In the United States, the rights enforceable under the Copyright 
Act last as long as the copyright: seventy years after the death of 
the author.349  Only a few of the non-copyright causes of action 
available to American authors expire at death.350  But a suit for 
unfair competition under common law or Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act could be brought at any time when anyone attempted 
to pass off goods that would confuse the public and would affect a 
concrete interest of “any person who believes that he or she is or is 
likely to be damaged . . . .”351  This standard is roughly similar to 
that employed by the Cour de Cassation for works in the public 
domain.352 
G.  Supremacy of Moral Rights in Theory 
Both French and German law rank the author’s “moral” interests 
above his “economic” interests.  The overriding objective of the 
French and German copyright laws is to enforce the author’s moral 
rights.  Thus, German law provides that a work is inalienable — 
copyright to a work can only be licensed, not transferred.353  And 
when interpreting the law, German courts must take into account 
the consideration that the author’s moral interests predominate.354 
The “primacy of moral rights” under French law manifests itself 
in three ways: (i) special rules of contract that favor the author in 
relation to publishers; (ii) the restriction on the property rights of 
publishers and the public in favor of the author; and, (iii) the 
exclusion of unpublished works from marital property and the right 
 
violation to copy the signature of a painter whose work had fallen into the public domain 
because there was no risk of confusion where “copie” was stamped on the back and the 
format of the canvases differed. 
 348 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 106-07 (although one of the suits involved one of the 
most prized books in French literature, “les Misérables,” by Victor Hugo). 
 349 See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1999). 
 350 For example, all the rights under tort law would expire. 
 351 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
 352 Cf. supra note 348 and accompanying text. 
 353 See FRG, supra note 89, art. 29. 
 354 See DIETZ, supra note 15, at 38-39 (citing the official government report on the 
passage of the law, Amtliche Begründung, at 29, right column). 
GUNLICKS.PP1 9/6/01  10:41 PM 
656 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.11:601 
 
of authors to maintain control of the moral rights during and after 
marriage.355 
Unlike French and German law, however, Berne fortunately 
does not require or infer that a member state grant supremacy to 
moral rights.  Such a condition would directly contradict the stated 
objective of the United States Constitution that copyright is 
protected in the public interest.  Still, American law (i) provides 
special rules of contract that favor an author, (ii) restricts the 
property rights of others to an author’s work, and (iii) favors 
unpublished works over other forms of property.356  Thus, 
American law grants special rights similar in principle to 
Continental law that confirm that “the individual author is the 
fountainhead of copyright.”357 
IX.  THE UNITED STATES’ INTEREST IN IMPLEMENTING MORAL 
RIGHTS 
A.  Compliance with the Berne Convention 
American law provides significant protections to the interests 
safeguarded by Berne’s rights of attribution and integrity.  There 
are some considerations, however, that lead to the conclusion that 
equivalent rights in the United States do not comply with the letter 
 
 355 See STROWEL, supra note 80, at 495. 
 356 The Copyright Act’s provision on transfer prevents any governmental entity from 
seizing a copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1997) (“When an individual author’s ownership 
of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights . . . has not previously been 
transferred . . .”).  The restriction does not apply to the proceeds from the copyright.  See 
BALL, supra note 197, at 61.  This provision was passed to “reaffirm the basic principle 
that the individual author is the fountainhead of copyright, and that his copyright cannot 
be taken away from him involuntarily.”  Second Supplementary Report of the Register of 
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, ch. I at 8-9; ch. XII at 8-
9 (drafted. 1975).  “The purpose of this subsection is to reaffirm the basic principle that 
the United States copyright of an individual author shall be secured to that author, and 
cannot be taken away by any involuntary transfer.”  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), 
reprinted in 17 U.S.C. § 960.  The Senate report also supports this position.  1 PATRY, 
supra note 17, at 144.  Only a voluntary declaration of bankruptcy allows an 
“involuntary” transfer.  17 U.S.C. § 201(e); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, reprinted in 17 
U.S.C. at 960.  Moreover, most of the equivalent rights are enforceable independently 
during and after a marriage. 
 357 See Second Supplementary Report, supra note 356, ch. I at 8-9; ch. XII at 8-9. 
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of Berne, nor with the object and purpose of Article 6bis.358 
The major contradiction between American law and Berne is 
that the author has no legally recognizable, enforceable moral 
rights — American law does not recognize moral rights.  As a 
result, there is a considerable possibility that an author attempting 
to protect his interests in attribution and integrity will be denied a 
cause of action.  Berne requires that authors “shall have” the rights 
of attribution and integrity.  Although Berne allows member states 
the choice of how to “safeguard” the rights, it does not allow them 
not to recognize these rights.359  How can one safeguard rights that 
do not exist?  If there is no recognized right, there is no recognized 
remedy. 
American law grants an author a number of possible causes of 
action that equate to moral rights.  But the author has no express 
rights of attribution and integrity under statutory or common 
law.360  Furthermore, the author carries the burden of securing his 
own moral rights — it is up to him to prove that he even has an 
alternative right before he can seek a vindication of his “moral 
rights.” 
Article 6bis provides an author clear and enforceable rights of 
attribution and integrity.  In order to prevent these rights from 
being directly enforceable, however, Congress stated expressly in 
the Berne Convention Implementation Act (hereinafter “BCIA”) 
that Berne was non-self-executing.361  Furthermore, both the BCIA 
and Berne became effective on March 1, 1989.362  The confluence 
of the effective dates for Berne and the BCIA ensured that the 
later-in-time rule would not cause the treaty to override the 
 
 358 See NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8D.02(D)(1) (U.S. moral rights protection 
“apparently fails to accord the full-fledged protection contemplated by Article 6bis”). 
 359 Prior to the U.S. accession to Berne, a congressional delegation met in Europe with 
international copyright experts.  These experts assured the U.S., “it is not necessary for 
the [U.S.] to enact statutory provisions on moral rights in order to comply with Article 
6bis [of Berne].  These requirements can be fulfilled . . . also by the common law and 
other statutes.”  H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990).  These experts did not pass judgment, 
however, on whether American equivalent rights actually complied with the convention. 
 360 With the exception of the VARA rights.  See supra notes 261 and accompanying 
text. 
 361 Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 (“BCIA”), Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 
Stat. 2853, § 2(1) (1988) (codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, 116, 116A, 205, 301, 401-408, 
411, 501, 504, 801 (1997)).  One third of the BCIA seeks to ensure that the treaty remains 
non-self-executing.  NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 1.12(A). 
 362 See BCIA, supra note 361, § 13(a). 
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BCIA.363  The greatest motivation behind these provisions was to 
prevent a direct application of moral rights in American courts.364  
Thereby, Congress clearly indicated its intent to avoid 
implementation of moral rights.  This lack of legislative 
recognition of moral rights has been influential in courts denying 
relief for moral rights infringement.365 
In addition, currently available causes of action and their 
likelihood of success are difficult to assess.  Some causes of action 
are under copyright law, some are not.366 Some of the potential 
claims arise under federal law, some under state law.367  Some 
arise under common law, some under statutory law.368  All this 
requires courts to look at the same issues from a potentially wide 
array of legal perspectives.  For those claims arising under federal 
law, a plaintiff has recourse to a federal court.369  Should federal 
claims in a case be dismissed, the federal court will no longer have 
jurisdiction and the plaintiff will have to reinitiate the case in state 
court.  As aliens, however, foreign authors would still have 
recourse to federal court, which would then be required to hear 
state law claims in a federal forum.370  All of these considerations 
place a significant burden on the plaintiff, the defendant, and the 
administration of justice. 
A further complicating factor is the effect a transfer of copyright 
has on the moral rights.  Berne requires that the moral rights exist 
independently of the copyright.371  Moral rights can be waived 
expressly and certain limited waivers can be implied.372  But the 
possibility that an author might not be allowed to pursue a right of 
attribution and integrity simply because he transferred his 
copyright violates Berne’s requirement that these rights be 
 
 363 See S. REP. NO. 100-352, at 28 (1988).  This raises the question of why Congress 
would go to such tactical trouble to circumvent the later-in-time rule.  The later-in-time 
rule would only be determinative if Berne were in actuality self-executing in spite of the 
conclusions of the President and the Congress that it is not. 
 364 See NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 1.12(A). 
 365 See Paramount Pictures v. Video Broad. Sys., Inc., 724 F. Supp. 808, 819 (D. Kan. 
1989).  See also Dana L. Burton, Comment, Artists’ Moral Rights: Controversy and the 
Visual Artists Rights Act, 48 SMU L. REV. 639, 646 (1995). 
 366 See supra notes 103-293 and accompanying text. 
 367 See id. 
 368 See id. 
 369 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 370 See id. 
 371 See Berne, supra note 95, at art. 6bis(1). 
 372 See supra notes 316-23 and accompanying text. 
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independent of each other.373  It also contradicts the Copyright 
Act’s rule empowering the author to determine which rights to 
transfer in an assignment of copyright.374 
Additionally, the effectiveness and interpretation of the 
equivalent rights vary from court to court.  With regard to the right 
of attribution, for example, the Second and Ninth Circuits — the 
most important circuits for copyright law — apply different 
standards under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, albeit with 
similar results.375  Whether a complete omission of an author’s 
name violates the right of attribution will depend on the court. 376 
 
 373 The right of attribution is generally protected in spite of a copyright transfer, 
except in cases of express waiver.  However, there is no express rule, thus clouding the 
issue and making a result less certain.  And the right to integrity is subject to a transfer 
under certain circumstances. 
 374 See 17 U.S.C. § 201 (a), (d). 
 375 The Second Circuit applies the “substantial similarity” standard of the Copyright 
Act to determine when a misattribution occurs.  Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 
43 F.3d 775, 781-82 (2d Cir. 1994).  “[C]opying is generally established by showing (a) 
that the defendant had access to the copyrighted work and (b) the substantial similarity of 
protectible material in the two works.”  Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656, 662 (2d 
Cir. 1993), cert. denied 510 U.S. 1112 (1994).  A misattribution occurs if a work is 
substantially similar to the author’s original work and does not credit the author.  See 
Waldman, 43 F.3d at 782-83. 
  The Ninth Circuit applies a “bodily appropriation” standard.  Cleary v. News 
Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1994).  The Ninth Circuit has held that a mere 
substantial similarity between works is insufficient to create the requisite consumer 
confusion that is the crux of a Lanham Act inquiry.  Id.  Thus, a work must “‘use . . . 
substantially the entire’” contents of the author’s work for a misattribution to be 
actionable.  Id. (citing Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 205 (9th 
Cir. 1989)).  Unfortunately, the Court did not clarify the distinction between substantial 
similarity and a substantial use of the entire content of a work.  In its opinion, the Court 
stated that “slight modifications of a product might cause customer confusion, while 
products which are merely generally similar will not.”  Id. at 1261.  This finding 
conforms to the requirement of substantial similarity that only substantial, not general, 
similarities between works pose a violation of an author’s right.  The Supreme Court 
applied the bodily appropriation standard in INS v. Associated Press, but stated that the 
“rewriting” of an article would satisfy the standard, which also resembles the test for 
substantial similarity.  248 U.S. 215, 243 (1918) (“bodily appropriation . . . with or 
without rewriting”).  Finally, in Cleary, the Ninth Circuit gave great weight to a case 
involving a patentable lathe.  30 F.3d at 1261 (citing Summit Mach. Tool Mfg. Corp. v. 
Victor CNC Sys., Inc., 7 F.3d 1434, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993)).  Because of the inherent 
differences between patentable and copyrightable works, the standards for one cannot be 
applied directly to the other.  Patent and copyright law are similar: they are both forms of 
intellectual property and are protected by the Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  But 
the “Constitution differentiates ‘authors’ and their ‘writings’ from ‘inventors’ and their 
‘discoveries.’”  Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc), 
cert. denied 429 U.S. 857 (1976). 
 376 The holding in Smith v. Montoro applies concretely only to cases of misattribution.  
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For the right of integrity, only the First Circuit has held that 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects the integrity of the work.  
No other circuit has ruled on the question.  How federal and state 
courts would rule under common law unfair competition is also 
uncertain, given the sparse precedent on the issue.  Moreover, 
courts require varying degrees of proof for finding consumer 
confusion in Section 43(a) and common law unfair competition 
cases.377 
Finally, the results of potential tort claims are also uncertain.  
Even a less well-known artist can qualify as a public figure.378  
Thus, a showing of malice might be required for a claim of 
defamation.379  In addition, the usefulness of an invasion of privacy 
claim is also limited.380 
Amidst this potential confusion a plaintiff quite possibly will be 
denied a cause of action for a violation of his rights of attribution 
or integrity.  A denial of a right will not violate Berne if the 
plaintiff is an American.381  But a failure to vindicate a right of 
 
648 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1981).  The Smith v. Montoro court’s discussion of reverse 
passing off indicates that it would make no distinction between a work marked falsely 
and one not marked at all.  See id. at 605-06.  Subsequent decisions support this opinion.  
See, e.g., Waldman, 43 F.3d at 782 (“It would constitute a false designation of origin to 
publish without attribution to its author a work that is original enough to deserve 
copyright protection.”); Cleary, 30 F.3d at 1261 (“‘Implied’ reverse passing off occurs 
when the wrongdoer simply removes or otherwise obliterates the name of the . . . source” 
and sells the product).  Although this is the most reasonable conclusion under the 
Lanham Act, it is not the only conclusion.  See 3 NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8D.03(A)(2). 
 377 Two Southern District of New York decisions made within ten months of each 
other demonstrate the difficulty caused by courts’ variation.  In Geisel, the court required 
“proof of injury to plaintiff or of actual deception of a portion of the buying public” and 
denied the claim.  295 F. Supp. at 353.  In Yameta, the court found a demonstration of a 
“likelihood of consumer deception” sufficient to grant relief.  279 F. Supp. at 587.  Other 
courts have denied a right absent proof of actual confusion.  Apple Corps Ltd. v. 
A.D.P.R., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 342, 346 (M.D. Tenn. 1993). 
 378 See Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ’ns, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 379 See Wojnarowicz, 745 F. Supp. at 148.  Knowledge of the statement’s falsity or a 
reckless disregard as to the truth of the statement qualifies as malice.  See New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 380 In some states the rights are statutory while in others they derive from the common 
law.  See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 254.  Not all states recognize all of these torts.  
SCHECHTER, supra note 125, at 125.  A false light claim is probably helpful only to well-
known authors.  Ross, supra note 173, at 377.  Depending on the circumstances, well-
known authors would therefore be limited to unflattering exposure claims.  Success under 
a “public disclosure of private facts” theory only guarantees that the author’s involvement 
be described truthfully, not that his name be deleted.  Zim, 573 F.2d at 1324. 
 381 See supra note 34. 
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attribution or integrity will violate the treaty if the work first 
appeared in another Berne member-state.  Whether or not Article 
6bis is self-executing, the United States has agreed to enforce it 
and a failure to do so violates its obligations under Berne. 
B.  Ease of Implementation 
The ease with which moral rights could be implemented is 
another reason for the United States to implement moral rights.  
Although the American equivalent rights have significant potential 
gaps, their underlying principle is the same as that which underlies 
Article 6bis — an author has interests in attribution and integrity 
and the right to prevent an unreasonable use of his work.  These 
equivalent rights provide tangible and significant protection for the 
rights of attribution and integrity. 
A close examination of the means by which France and 
Germany regulate moral rights also supports the conclusion that 
American implementation of moral rights would hardly disturb the 
current state of American law.  Though the rights are framed in 
broad terms, France and Germany place limits on the author’s 
exercise of moral rights.  Continental law also essentially prevents 
those uses that are unreasonable.382 
Implementation of moral rights in America will not affect the 
current limits that the law currently places on the author’s interests 
in attribution and integrity.  For example, the work-made-for-hire 
doctrine will remain intact; which is particularly meaningful for 
the motion picture industry, traditionally one of the staunchest 
opponents of moral rights.383  In addition, the industry will not be 
required to adopt the Continental policy of designating the director 
as the primary copyright holder, nor will it have to grant significant 
new rights to directors, actors, authors, etc.384  Many of these rights 
 
 382 The definition of reasonableness will differ somewhat from country to country and 
from system to system.  But such distinctions go to the enforcement, and not the 
recognition, of moral rights. 
 383 See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 22, at 176, 184. 
 384 This is exemplified by the new European Union directive on copyright law that 
grants producers the right to control the publication of a motion picture, although authors, 
actors, and directors are the primary rights holders under the laws of most E.U. member 
states.  See Council Directive 01/29, art. 3 (c), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16. 
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are already guaranteed contractually,385 or statutorily by the 
California Business and Professions Code.386 
Furthermore, moral rights will remain subject to contract law.387  
Express waivers of moral rights will still be enforceable.388  
Waivers can be implied when such an implication would be 
reasonable under the circumstances.389  As with VARA and as 
required by Berne, the law will have to ensure the independence of 
the moral rights from the copyright, but such a provision will not 
change the current state of American law dramatically.390 
With regard to damages and duration, the United States can still 
limit damages for non-economic injuries or for non-commercial 
uses of a work by a defendant.391  In addition, the United States 
will not be required to implement perpetual moral rights;392 only a 
 
 385 For example, by the recent agreement between the Writers Guild of America and 
motion picture and television producers that guarantees extensive attribution rights to 
authors.  See WRITERS GUILD OF AMERICA, SCREEN CREDITS MANUAL, III. GUILD POLICY 
ON CREDITS (2001), available at http://wga.org/credits/Manual/screen3.html (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2001). 
 386 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
 387 The only limitation is that they remain independent of the copyright. 
 388 See supra notes 316-20 and accompanying text. 
 389 See supra notes 316-23 and accompanying text. 
 390 Many of the equivalent rights are already independent of a copyright transfer.  The 
right of attribution is usually protected absent an express waiver.  The largest impact 
would be on the right to integrity, where certain causes of action are currently subject to a 
transfer of copyright.  However, absent a waiver, providing for the independence of 
moral rights and copyright will only require publishers not to make unreasonable changes 
to a work.  Good faith changes required by the medium of exploitation will still be 
allowed. 
 391 These issues go to the redress of the moral rights, not their recognition.  See, e.g., 
Merchant v. Lymon, 828 F. Supp. 1048, 1059-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding no right to 
recover absent an economic loss).  French law, for example, also limits recovery for injuries 
whose economic impact is minimal.  Supra note 152 and accompanying text.  But where 
marketability depends on reputation, being credited with a work constitutes a protectible 
interest reasonably subject to legal protection.  NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8D.03(A)(4). 
  “Commercial injury” implies that the violation occurs “in connection with the sale 
of goods or services . . . .”  Wojnarowicz, 745 F. Supp. at 142.  Under current law, a 
plaintiff will only have standing under Section 43(a) if he can show a “potential for a 
commercial or competitive injury.”  Berni v. International Gourmet Rests. of Am., 838 F.2d 
642, 648 (2d Cir. 1988).  In F.E.L. Publ’ns, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, Catholic 
churches in Chicago copied hymns without the permission of the copyright owners.  506 
F. Supp. 1127, 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1981), cert denied, 459 U.S. 859, appeal dismissed, 739 
F.2d 1093 (7th Cir. 1984), reh’g, 754 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1985).  The court found no 
violation of § 43(a) because the copies did not enter into commerce.  Id. 
 392 See supra notes 337-52 and accompanying text. 
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minority of countries grant perpetual protection to moral rights.393 
Once the United States incorporates the protection of the 
author’s interests of attribution and integrity into the Copyright 
Act, all of the moral rights recognized by the French and German 
copyright laws will be included in the American statute.394  The 
Congress and the courts have followed an expansive policy for 
copyright law since the first law was implemented in 1790.  
Congress has always adopted the policy of including all possible 
exclusive rights related to copyright law in the Copyright Act.  
Adding rights of attribution and integrity to the author’s rights of 
the Act would place all of the author’s basic interests currently 
recognized within or without of copyright law under the Copyright 
Act’s jurisdiction. 
C.  Equal Treatment for American Authors in America 
Recognizing moral rights will also benefit American authors.  
Foreign authors already have some greater rights than Americans 
under the Copyright Act.395  And Berne places obligations on 
American courts to enforce moral rights for foreigners.  American 
courts must enforce foreigners’ moral rights or the United States 
will be in breach of the treaty.  A foreign author can walk into an 
American court and demand moral rights protection —  a failure to 
recognize this protection would violate the Convention in spite of 
Article 6bis being non-self-executing.396 
Thus, American authors have less protection in the United States 
than foreign authors do.  This seems odd given that the reason the 
United States increased the rights of foreigners and joined Berne 
was to increase the rights of American authors.397  The adoption of 
moral rights will finally “secure the highest available level of 
international copyright protection of American artists, authors, and 
 
 393 See supra note 345 and accompanying text. 
 394 The rights to publish and retract are already statutorily protected.  Supra notes 30-
34 and accompanying text. 
 395 For example, in 1994 the U.S. resurrected copyright protection for foreign works 
that had been in the public domain, but had been published within the past seventy-five 
years.  No such resurrection occurred for works of American origin.  NIMMER, supra note 
2, at § 9.01. 
 396 Even if Article 6bis is not self-executing under American law, the obligation to 
adhere to the treaty remains. 
 397 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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copyright holders” at home and abroad.398 
D.  Future Challenges to Copyright Protection 
Computers and the Internet are creating a parallel, metaphysical 
world with no legal, physical, territorial, or cultural boundaries.399  
This progress provides limitless possibilities for violations of 
copyright and moral rights.  Violations of copyright and the right 
to publish have already occurred.400  A violation of the author’s 
rights can occur before the author or transferee even has an 
opportunity to publish the work in its original, physical form.401 
The piracy of software on the Internet is a serious problem that 
costs authors millions of dollars a year.402  And music piracy has 
exploded causing tremendous controversy in the music industry 
and becoming a matter of intense litigation.403  The potential piracy 
of other works is impossible to gauge. 
The potential threat to an author’s “moral rights” has also 
increased significantly.  Modern technology has transcended 
fixation.  Fixation has always been an inherent quality of 
copyrightable expression: a work cannot generally be perceived 
and marketed if it is not fixed, i.e., if it does not have physical 
form.404  But computer technology has freed expression from form.  
The author’s expression is no longer trapped and tangible; it is 
fluid and malleable in cyber-space.  These changes make it 
possible for anyone — not just publishers — to reproduce a work 
 
 398 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 399 See Janet Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844, 890 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 400 See, e.g., Doreen Carvajal, Children’s Book Casts a Spell Over Adults, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 1, 1999, at B1; Neil Strauss, Expert to Help Devise Format for Delivering 
Music on Net, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999, at C1; Jon Pareles, Trying to Get in Tune with 
the Digital Age, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1999, at C1. 
 401 For example, the availability on the Internet of “American Pie 2” before its release.  
See Bernard Warner, Why Pay to See ‘American Pie 2’ When It’s Free Online,  REUTERS, 
Aug. 2, 2001 available at www.reuters.com (last visited Aug. 2, 2001).  Another example 
is that the biography of François Mitterrand appeared on the Internet during publication 
and distribution of the actual book. 
 402 See Paul Taylor, Software Pirates Boom on the Internet: Intellectual Property 
Businesses May Be Losing $1 Billion a Year Through Illegal Copying, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 
2, 1999, at 6. 
 403 For example, the ongoing controversy and litigation over napster.com. 
 404 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1997) (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works 
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . .”). 
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with a false attribution or without any attribution.  Additionally, 
these changes greatly simplify the ability to cut and paste a work 
thereby increasing the potential for violations of the work’s 
integrity.405  Finally, technological advancement makes possible 
the creation of performances generated entirely by computer.  This 
threat is greatest for the motion picture industry and actors.  It will 
be possible to make an entire original film using an actor’s image, 
voice, and artistic expressions without the consent of actors or 
producers whose success is tied to the actors they employ.406 
E.  Interest in International Cooperation 
The global nature of the Internet will make international 
protection of works of authorship more important than ever.  
International and national historical experiences have shown that 
authors in one state are threatened by insufficient or non-existent 
copyright protection in other states.407 
Members of Berne recently addressed some of these concerns by 
adopting the “Copyright Treaty.”408  The Copyright Treaty 
provides that authors have the “exclusive right of authorizing any 
communication to the public of their works” on the Internet or by 
any other “wire or wireless means.”409  The treaty also grants 
authors an exclusive right to distribute their works by “sale or 
 
 405 The “facile use of . . . scissors” is easier than ever before.  Folsom, 9 Fed. Cas. at  
344-45; see supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 406 See Bernd Graff, Das Binäre im Auge des Feindes, SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, July 
10, 2001 available at www.sueddeutsche.de (last visited Aug. 2, 2001) (describing the 
technological capability to digitally copy actors’ faces, bodies and movements); Lisa 
Guernsey, Software Called Capable of Copying Any Human Voice, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 
2001 available at www.nyt.com (last visited Aug. 2, 2001).  This development might 
require a limited expansion of moral rights.  Such a law would protect the author’s 
physical expressions contained in his or her works, and would thus be compatible with 
copyright law. 
 407 The Constitution included copyright among the federal powers to ensure efficient 
national protection.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison).  The experiences in 
nineteenth century Europe — particularly in the politically fractured Germany — 
demonstrated the dangers of differing and inadequate levels of enforcement.  JAMES 
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 376-78 n.d (1896) (Oliver W. Holmes, Jr. & 
John M. Gould eds.) (“The case of Germany shows how important it was [in the U.S.] 
that the law of copyright should rest on the broad basis of federal jurisdiction.”). 
 408 See Copyright Treaty, supra note 1, preamble (“Recognizing the profound impact 
of the development and convergence of information and communication technologies on 
the creation and use of literary and artistic works . . . .”). 
 409 Id. art. 8.  See also id. art. 4. 
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other transfer of ownership.”410  It does not interfere with national 
contract regulations after the first sale or transfer.411  The treaty 
does not include a specific moral rights provision but stipulates 
that all parties “shall comply with Articles 1 to 21” of Berne.412  
Both the United States and the European Union have signed the 
Copyright Treaty, which will go into effect as soon as thirty states 
have acceded to it.413 
The challenge remains, however, to extend effective copyright 
regulation for all means of public communication to those nations 
not guaranteeing sufficient enforcement.  This includes bringing 
those nations not party to Berne into the international copyright 
community and improving enforcement in nations not providing 
efficient enforcement.414 
Similarly, American authors’ interests in attribution and integrity 
will be violated abroad.  These interests are protected by Berne.  It 
will be in the American interest to work for effective international 
protection of moral rights and for increasing the global reach of 
Berne.  The greatest incentive for authors to create will be if all 
their creative interests are protected worldwide.  Additionally it 
will provide the greatest profit to authors and their assigns and 
ensure the greatest progress for science and the useful arts. 
The current American stance on moral rights prevents the most 
effective global protection of authors’ interests.  The largest market 
in the world provides no moral rights to American authors.  
Foreign authors possess the right, but assessing the legal landscape 
in order to determine a course of action is a near impossible task 
for foreign authors.  This hardship alone will likely cause 
controversy.  As well, the possibility that a foreign author will be 
denied relief only increases the risk of confrontation.  The lack of a 
recognition of moral rights will make it more difficult to reach 
agreement with other nations on international issues of copyright, 
because it will cause them to question the sincerity of American 
 
 410 Id. art. 6(1). 
 411 See id. art. 6(2). 
 412 See id. art. 1(4). 
 413 See GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES TREATIES IN FORCE: CURRENT TREATY ACTION 
SUPPLEMENT (Igor I. Kavass ed., 2000). 
 414 For example, copyright enforcement in China.  See Mark A. Groombridge, The 
Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights Protection in the People’s Republic of 
China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMERGING MARKETS, 11-46 (Clarisa Long 
ed., 2000). 
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efforts to provide the highest degree of international protection 
possible to authors everywhere. 
The United States is the last major Common Law copyright 
system that has not implemented statutory moral rights or is not in 
the process of doing so.  Among the factors that convinced the 
United States it could join Berne without implementing moral 
rights was the lack of statutory moral rights protection in the 
United Kingdom and Australia.415  But in 1988, the same year that 
the United States acceded to Berne, the United Kingdom 
implemented a new copyright act with moral rights provisions to 
comply with Berne.416  And Australia implemented moral rights in 
2000.417  Other important common law states have implemented 
moral rights protections.418  Moreover, citing the lack of protection 
in other states as a reason to refuse the implementation of moral 
rights is not a legal argument, but a political one.419 
The United States attempted to dampen the international impact 
of moral rights in the TRIPs annex to the WTO convention.420  
Article 9(1) of TRIPs provides that TRIPs incorporates Berne in its 
entirety but for Article 6bis.  Although TRIPs offers greater and 
more effective protections of copyright than Berne, it will not 
change any international obligations to enforce moral rights.421  
More than 130 states are party to Berne, including all major 
producers and consumers of copyrighted works.422  Unless all 
member-states agree to abolish the treaty, it will remain important 
for copyright law. 
Even if TRIPs should push Berne aside as the prominent 
copyright treaty, it will not push aside the issue of moral rights.  
 
 415 See Final Report, supra note 196, 548-49. 
 416 See Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988, reprinted in 3 UNESCO, COPYRIGHT 
LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1988). 
 417 See Copyright Amendment (Moral Rights) Act 2000 (Austl.). 
 418 Canada implemented moral rights in 1985.  Waiver, supra note 130, at 33-55.  
India implemented moral rights in 1994.  Shondeep Banerji, The Indian Intellectual 
Property Rights Regime and the TRIPs Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
IN EMERGING MARKETS, supra note 414, at 51. 
 419 The United States would still be in violation of its legal obligations under Berne, 
regardless of the laws of other countries. 
 420 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Legal Instruments — Result of the Uruguay Round, Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994). 
 421 See NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 18.06 (“TRIPs cannot serve as the basis for releasing 
Members from their antecedent treaty obligations.”). 
 422 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 355-56 (1999). 
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The laws of France, Germany, and most nations of the world are 
predicated on the notion that copyright law serves to protect the 
interests of the individual author and these laws hold moral rights 
to be the most important interests an author has.  Moral rights will 
always remain fundamentally important.  Any attempt to diminish 
their importance will be met with resistance by European Union 
member states and many others.  And overreaching attempts to 
extinguish the impact of moral rights will be met with anger and 
bitterness. 
Finally, it is in public interest of the United States to protect 
authors’ rights of attribution and integrity on a global scale.  Such 
protection will guarantee authors the international recognition and 
respect they deserve as well as increase their marketability. 
Unreasonable designations or uses of their works will only harm 
authors’ success and their incentive to create. 
In addition, the United States should even consider expanding 
the scope of moral rights by lobbying for a right to prevent 
unauthorized use of an author’s means of expression — face, 
voice, gestures — subject to fair use and other exceptions.  An 
inclusion of such a right in Berne or TRIPs would protect globally 
against computer-generated theft of an author’s image and 
expression.423 
X.  CONCLUSION 
The challenges of the future can only be met by eliminating the 
conflicts of the past.  It is in the best interest of the American 
public and American authors to implement moral rights.  As the 
world’s largest producer of works of authorship, the United States 
has a powerful national interest in providing the greatest degree of 
international protection possible for these works.424  No one stands 
to gain as much from a strong international recognition of authors’ 
rights as American authors.425  Moral rights are the last remaining 
 
 423 See supra note 406.  Such rights are protected in American law by unfair 
competition, privacy, and perhaps under the copyright act.  Assessing such rights in 
foreign jurisdictions will be a cumbersome task and the likelihood of success will be 
difficult to gauge.  Having a clear international rule of law on the issue would simplify 
enforcement. 
 424 See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 22. 
 425 Individual and corporate American authors will depend increasingly on the level of 
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barrier to international consensus on the most basic rights of 
authors.  The official recognition of moral rights would be a small 
but highly significant step towards reaching international closure 
on the basic principles and rights that copyright law entails and in 
achieving the “highest available level of international copyright 
protection” for American authors.426 
The conflict over moral rights results from misperception and 
misunderstanding.  Moral rights are not an amorphous bundle of 
rights that allow an over-sensitive author to interfere with the 
profitable public use of his work.  They are a specific set of rights 
that protect fundamental interests of an author in relation to his 
work.  American law recognizes these interests and their 
importance for the author’s creative drive.  The Copyright Act 
already incorporates the right to publish and the right to retract.  As 
well, many of the protections for attribution and integrity in 
American law already achieve results similar to the level of 
protection in France and Germany.427 
The United States and Europe are tantalizingly close to reaching 
full agreement on the basic rights of an author.  Both systems are 
based on the author’s fundamental right to control his work and its 
uses.  Both systems recognize the interests of the public and 
publishers in the use of a work and balance the interests of all three 
groups to achieve effective regulation.  And both systems limit 
moral rights in the public interest but require a reasonable use of an 
author’s work to protect the work from unfair uses. 
No compelling reason exists to continue the controversy over 
moral rights and to resist a greater consensus between the 
European and American copyright systems. Moral rights and the 
public interest do not stand in opposition to one another: the 
fundamental interests of authors and the public good are in 
complete harmony.428 
 
international protection to assure they receive adequate compensation and respect for 
their works. 
 426 Hatch, supra note 22, at 171 (quoting Remarks of President Ronald Reagan on 
Signing the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 1405 (Oct. 31, 1988)). 
 427 French and German law go beyond the minimum requirements of Berne, but the 
United States can limit its protection to the standards imposed by Berne. 
 428 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (“The public good fully 
coincides . . . with the claims of individuals.”). 
